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THREE ESSAYS IN FOOD CONSUMPTION AND HEALTH RELATED ISSUES 
 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays that make contributions to the research on food 
consumption and health-related issues. Essay I elaborates on how the interactions of 
consumers’ beliefs and actions influence Food-Away-From-Home (FAFH) consumption 
and tests whether consumers compensate for the high caloric intake typically associated 
with FAFH by changing their behaviors during other meals. Essay II studies consumers’ 
choices related to time allocations for food consumption and tests how consumers’ 
lifestyles moderate the effect of secondary eating (eating while doing other activities) on 
obesity. Lastly, Essay III examines intertemporal choices, through which individuals 
make trade-offs between immediate gratifications and future health, and tests the validity 
of the use of time preference proxies in the investigation of health outcomes. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Since the mid-1970s, obesity has rapidly increased among U.S. consumers. 
Approximately two out of three adults are either overweight or obese (U.S. Department 
of Agricultural, 2016b). The high prevalence of obesity is a public health concern due to 
the high costs incurred by individuals and society. Obesity increases the risk for chronic 
diseases such as diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, musculoskeletal disorders, and cancer 
(World Health Organization, 2016). In 2008 dollars, the direct cost of obesity regarding 
medical expenditure was $147 billion (Finkelstein, Trogdon, Cohen, & Dietz, 2009). 
Food-Away-From-Home (FAFH), secondary eating, and time preferences are three of 
many factors blamed for obesity (Cawley, 2015; Rosin, 2008). This dissertation 
investigates these factors in three essays. 
1.1. The Ability to Eat Food-Away-From-Home and Still Eat Healthy 
FAFH consumption has rapidly increased since 1970. The proportion of food 
expenditure spent on FAFH increased from 25.9% in 1970 to 43.1% in 2012 (U.S. 
Department of Agricultural, 2016a). Previous research has attributed FAFH to poor diet 
quality in terms of high caloric intake (Beydoun, Powell, & Wang, 2009; J. K. Binkley, 
2008; Bowman & Vinyard, 2004; Lin & Cuthrie, 2012; Mancino, Todd, & Lin, 2009; 
Taveras et al., 2005; Todd, Mancino, & Lin, 2010). The high demand as well as the high 
caloric intake associated with FAFH have led to the identification of FAFH as a factor 
that contributes to obesity. Although FAFH is high in calories, consumers might attempt 
to reduce caloric intake during other meals. To that end, Essay I tests whether consumers 
compensate for the high caloric intake typically associated with FAFH. The analysis uses 
data from the 2009-10 National Health and Nutritional Examination Survey (NHANES). 
2 
 
The NHANES is a food intake survey that provides detailed information for two non-
consecutive days of food consumption. 
Essay I makes two contributions to the existing literature. First, Essay I discusses 
how consumers change their behaviors on a meal-by-meal basis. For example, if a person 
eats an away from home breakfast, the analysis determines how his or her behavior 
changes during lunch and dinner to compensate for the high calories of the FAFH 
breakfast. The first essay also elaborates on the cognitive aspects of the compensating 
behavior. There is a consensus among consumers that FAFH is less nutritious than food 
cooked at home. Nonetheless, consumers demand FAFH because of price, taste, 
convenience, or socializing. We use the theory of cognitive dissonance to explain how 
negative beliefs about FAFH, which are contrary to the consumers’ actions of eating 
FAFH, create a state of cognitive dissonance. To resolve cognitive dissonance, 
consumers compensate for FAFH by changing their behaviors during other meals. 
1.2. The Mindlessness and the Mindfulness of Secondary Eating 
Secondary eating is defined as eating while doing something else, such as reading 
or watching TV. While engaging in secondary eating, consumers might not be able to 
closely monitor the amount of food, leading to overeating and obesity (Wansink, 2007). 
Since the 1970s, the trend of secondary eating time has paralleled the trend of obesity, 
and secondary eating has been thus blamed for obesity. The second essay tests the effect 
of secondary eating on obesity. Studies that investigate the effect of secondary eating 
assume that secondary eating similarly affects every consumer. The contribution that the 
second essay makes to the literature is to relax this assumption, identifying situations 
when secondary eating increases body weight (termed “mindless secondary eating”) and 
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when secondary eating decreases body weight (termed “mindful secondary eating”). We 
hypothesize that lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating on obesity. 
Maintaining a sedentary lifestyle increases the odds of mindless secondary eating. On the 
contrary, maintaining an active lifestyle decreases the chances of mindless secondary 
eating. 
Essay II uses data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). A subsample of 
participants from the Current Population Survey (CPS) was randomly selected to provide 
diaries of their activities for 24 hours, starting at 4:00 am the day before the interview. 
The Eating and Health Module contains information on secondary eating. We use two 
methods to account for lifestyle elements. The first method is to compare engagement in 
sedentary activities as well as physical activities. For example, watching TV for 4 hours 
increases the probability of mindless secondary eating as opposed to watching TV for 
half an hour. The second method is to compare secondary eating during different types of 
primary activities. In reality, secondary eating during working or driving might have a 
different effect from secondary eating while watching TV. 
1.3. Validating the Use of Time Preference Proxies to Explain Effects on Health 
Outcomes 
Food consumption and health-related issues are intertemporal choices that reflect 
trade-offs between immediate gratifications and future well-being. The rate of time 
preferences indicates the extent to which consumers can delay benefits. Patient 
individuals forgo present gratifications to obtain future benefits. Impatient people weigh 
present gratifications more than future well-being, so they are unable to delay benefits. 
To estimate the effect of time preferences on health outcomes, researchers either elicit the 
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rate of time preference using monetary present-future trade-off questionnaires or use 
proxies. Essay III investigates the validity of using time preference proxies to estimate 
the effects on health outcomes, determining if variations in elicited discount rates 
correspond to variations in time preference proxies. The contribution of the third essay is 
methodological: to provide researchers who are interested in determining the effect of 
time preferences on health outcomes with guidance on how to measure time preferences. 
The analysis uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). 
Before 2006, the NLSY79 provided information that can be used as proxies for time 
preferences. In 2006, the NLSY79 included two hypothetical monetary trade-off 
elicitation questions. The first question is over a month time horizon, and the second is 
over a year time horizon. These two time frames for the elicitation questions allow for 





Chapter 2: The Ability to Eat Food-Away-From-Home and Still Eat Healthy 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Since 1970, U.S. consumer diets have shown an increased demand for Food-
Away-From-Home (FAFH). FAFH expenditure rose from 25.9% of total food 
expenditure in 1970 to 43.1% by 2012 (U.S. Department of Agricultural, 2016a). 
Because of the high caloric intake, FAFH tends to be blamed for the obesity epidemic in 
the United States (Beydoun et al., 2009; J. K. Binkley, 2008; Bowman & Vinyard, 2004; 
Lin & Cuthrie, 2012; Mancino et al., 2009; Taveras et al., 2005; Todd et al., 2010). 
Approximately two adults in three are either overweight or obese (U.S. Department of 
Agricultural, 2016b). 
Health advocates have called for FAFH regulations to improve people’s diets and 
reduce obesity, in particular after FAFH became readily available (Cutler, Glaeser, & 
Shapiro, 2003), unavoidable for many reasons such as business meetings or social 
gatherings taking place at restaurants (Cohen & Bhatia, 2012), and increasingly tasty and 
visually appealing (Blechert, Klackl, Miedl, & Wilhelm, 2016). However, regulations 
focusing on FAFH are controversial. On the one hand, proponents of regulations argue 
that consumers lack both the ability to make healthy choices when eating away from 
home and the willpower to compensate during other meals for the excessive caloric 
intake associated with FAFH (Cohen & Bhatia, 2012). On the other hand, opponents of 
regulations argue that consumers can compensate for FAFH during other meals 
(Anderson & Matsa, 2011; Cutler et al., 2003). In order to illuminate the link between 
FAFH and obesity and the justification for such regulations, this paper elaborates on 
consumers’ beliefs and behaviors relating to FAFH and tests whether consumers 
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compensate by changing behavior during other meals for the high calories associated 
with FAFH. 
Examples of FAFH regulations intended to develop better eating patterns and 
reduce obesity include: 1) The fast food ban in south Los Angeles, where obesity is 
highly prevalent, prohibiting the establishment of a stand-alone fast food restaurant 
(Sturm & Cohen, 2009);  2) The Healthy Eating Option Program in Watsonville, 
California, in which a permit approval for a new restaurant is conditional on providing 
healthier meals (Watsonville Municipal Code, 2010)1; 3) Standards for restaurant food 
accompanied by toys in San Francisco, California (Otten et al., 2014)2; and 4) The 2010 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which requires chain restaurants with at least 
20 branches to provide nutritional information (Swartz, Braxton, & Viera, 2011) so 
consumers can make informed choices. 
In addition to nutrition, other factors come into play when choosing a meal, such 
as taste and convenience. In a survey of New Jersey households (Stewart, Blisard, & 
Jolliffe, 2006), respondents were asked to rank their preferences for FAFH on a scale of 1 
(less preferred) to 5 (highly preferred) in terms of taste, nutrition, and convenience. On 
average, the responses were 4.5 for taste, 3.9 for nutrition, and 3.5 for convenience, 
indicating that when consumers dine away from home, they think about taste and 
convenience as important aspects of food consumption. Other studies drawn from the 
                                                 
1 The approval of a new permit requires getting at least 6 out of 19 points. For example, 2 points are 
obtained by offering at least 4 choices of fruits or vegetables prepared in a low-fat way (e.g., green salad, 
baked potato) (Sturm & Cohen, 2009). 
2 For example, the maximum caloric intake per meal is 600 calories, and the maximum level of sodium per 




household production theory emphasize the importance of the convenience of FAFH. The 
assumption is that changes in socioeconomic factors, such as increased time at work, 
increase the opportunity cost of time. Consequently, the shift in consumers’ preferences 
toward consuming more FAFH reflects their demand for convenience. McCracken and 
Brandt (1987) estimate the demand for FAFH based on the type of FAFH facilities 
(restaurants, fast food, and other commercial establishments). Their results show a 
significant effect of time value on FAFH expenditure. Yen (1993) finds that households 
with higher income and working wives are more likely to consume FAFH. J. K. Binkley 
(2006) and Stewart, Blisard, Bhuyan, and Nayga Jr (2004) also find hours worked outside 
the house to positively affect the demand for FAFH. 
Studies that consider the association between FAFH and high caloric intake may 
ignore the ability of consumers to compensate for FAFH. Consumers sometimes act as if 
they have a caloric budget (Variyam, 2005). The excessive calories corresponding to 
FAFH are traded off at other meals. Cutler et al. (2003) explain that FAFH has no causal 
effect on obesity because typically, if one eats FAFH, they will compensate by eating less 
food later in the day.3 Anderson and Matsa (2011) estimate the effect of FAFH on obesity 
and test for the compensating behavior. For their identification strategy, Anderson and 
Matsa (2011) use the placement of interstate highways in rural areas to obtain exogenous 
variations in FAFH prices to explain variations in obesity. They claim there is no causal 
effect of FAFH on obesity due to the compensatory behavior (Anderson & Matsa, 2011). 
To test for the compensatory behavior, Anderson and Matsa (2011) consider the 
                                                 
3 Instead, Cutler et al. (2003) attribute the obesity epidemic to the low prices of FAFH wherein consumers 
with hyperbolic discounting and high preferences for high calories are most affected by the low prices. 
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difference between the effect of an away from home meal on the meal caloric intake and 
the daily caloric intake. A substantial effect of FAFH on calories at the meal level and a 
minimal effect on calories at the daily level demonstrates the compensating behavior. It 
is, however, unclear how consumers change their behavior during other meals to 
compensate for FAFH. For instance, if an away from home breakfast increases caloric 
intake, how do consumers compensate for the breakfast’s excessive calories during lunch 
and dinner?  
This paper also examines consumers’ abilities to compensate for FAFH by 
changing their behaviors during other meals. We contribute to the existing literature by 
investigating how consumers change their behaviors on a meal-by-meal basis. For 
example, if a person eats an away from home breakfast, the analysis tests if behavior 
changes during lunch and dinner to compensate for the high calories from FAFH. We 
also contribute to the existing literature by elaborating on the cognitive aspects of the 
compensating behavior for FAFH. We use data from the 2009-10 National Health and 
Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES). The NHANES is food intake data in which 
consumers provide information from two non-consecutive days about their food 
consumption. The Consumer Behavior Phone Follow-up Module provides information 
about consumers’ beliefs. There is a consensus among consumers that FAFH is less 
nutritious than food cooked at home. Nonetheless, consumers demand FAFH because of 
price, taste, convenience, or socializing. We implement the theory of cognitive 
dissonance introduced by Festinger (1962) to explain how the negative beliefs about 
FAFH that are contrary to the consumers’ actions of eating FAFH create a state of 
cognitive dissonance. To resolve cognitive dissonance, we hypothesize that consumers 
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compensate for FAFH by changing behavior during other meals. The results support our 
hypothesis of the compensating behavior. For example, an away from home breakfast 
increases breakfast caloric intake by 378 calories, but consumers change their behavior 
during lunch by reducing lunch calories by 149 calories. 
We perform two robustness consistency tests of our results with the theory of 
cognitive dissonance. We test the compensating behavior for the addictive components of 
FAFH. FAFH is high in sugar, carbohydrates, fat, and salt (Lin & Cuthrie, 2012; Todd et 
al., 2010), which are addictive components (Gearhardt, Corbin, & Brownell, 2009; Soto-
Escageda et al., 2016). The implication is that if addiction prevents consumers from 
compensating for FAFH during other meals, the results are inconsistent with the theory of 
cognitive dissonance. We also perform a placebo test. It is impossible to imagine that 
drinking plain water has the same effect as FAFH. If so, then the results cannot be 
explained by the theory of cognitive dissonance. These tests indicate that our results are 
consistent with the theory of cognitive dissonance. 
The results suggest redirecting policies toward increasing the efficacy of the 
compensatory behavior rather than restricting the availability of FAFH. There is no single 
type of food that can be the only assessment of diet quality. Eating FAFH does not 
automatically entail a poor diet, and eating food cooked at home does not ensure a better 
diet. The balance between foods from all sources due to the compensatory behavior is a 
better and more effective assessment of diet quality. The remainder of this essay is 
divided into five sections. Section 2.2 presents the data used for the analysis. Section 2.3 
discusses the model. Section 2.4 reports the results. Section 2.5 checks the robustness of 




We utilize data from the 2009-10 National Health and Nutritional Examination 
Survey (NHANES). For two non-consecutive days, the NHANES collected information 
on food intake. Consumers were personally interviewed on day one. On day two, 
consumers were interviewed by phone three to ten days later. The NHANES asked 
consumers about individual food intake regarding the type of food they had, from where 
it was obtained (e.g., a store, a table service restaurant, a fast food place), the name of the 
meal (e.g., breakfast, lunch, dinner), and the intake day of the week. Thus, the NHANES 
could calculate the amount of caloric intake for each item reported. 
The Consumer Behavior Phone Follow-up Module provides information on 
beliefs about fast food and restaurant food in comparison to food cooked at home, so we 
restrict the sample to consumers from whom we could retain information on their beliefs 
regarding FAFH. The Consumer Behavior Phone Follow-up Module asks consumers the 
following questions: 
“Do you buy food from fast food or pizza places because it 
is cheaper than foods cooked at home?” 
“Do you buy food from fast food or pizza places because the 
foods there are more nutritious than cooking at home?” 
“Do you buy food from fast food or pizza places because the 
foods there taste better than foods cooked at home?”  
“Do you buy food from fast food or pizza places because it 
is more convenient than cooking at home?” 
“Do you eat at fast food or pizza places instead of cooking 
at home to socialize with family and friends?” 
11 
 
Consumers also answer the same questions regarding restaurant food, so we 
limited the analysis to FAFH from these two sources. The final sample consists of 7,538 
observations. Panel A of Table 2.1 presents summary statistics of consumers’ beliefs 
relating to FAFH. On average, only 2% of consumers consider fast food is more 
nutritious than food cooked at home, while only 4% of consumers think restaurant food is 
more nutritious than food cooked at home. In general, consumers are more likely to 
associate fast food with convenience and low prices and more likely to associate 
restaurant food with taste and socializing. Consumers’ behaviors regarding FAFH are 
reported in Panel B of Table 2.1. The average daily FAFH consumption is equal to 0.6 
meal, where the weekly FAFH consumption averages 4 meals.4  
This link between beliefs and behaviors relating to FAFH reveals a general 
agreement among consumers that FAFH is less nutritious than food at home, but 
consumers continue to consume FAFH. We implement the theory of cognitive dissonance 
to explain how the inconsistency between beliefs and behaviors creates a state of 
cognitive dissonance. We hypothesize that consumers compensate for FAFH by changing 
behavior during other meals to resolve the dissonance. 
Compensating for FAFH implies ingesting more calories when eating out, and 
then changing behavior during other meals, so we limit our sample to the three major 
meals, breakfast, lunch, and dinner. From an economic standpoint, the excessive calories 
associated with FAFH meals are optimal choices (Anderson & Matsa, 2011). This 
                                                 
4 The average daily FAFH consumption is calculated from the two-non-consecutive day of food intake. The 
weekly FAFH consumption is calculated from consumers’ responses to how many meals not home 
prepared consumed a week in the Diet Behavior and Nutrition Section in the National Health and 
Nutritional Examination Survey. 
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rationale is underlined by the assumption that the portion size of an away from home 
meal is larger than that cooked at home (Anderson & Matsa, 2011; Jeitschko & 
Pecchenino, 2006). Food cooked at home involves a sunk cost of food preparation and a 
price for groceries, while eating away from home involves only a sunk cost. At home, a 
consumer ingests calories until the marginal utility is equal to the price paid for groceries. 
When dining away from home, the consumer ingests calories until either finishing the 
meal, which is relatively larger, or being fully satiated at zero marginal utility. Hence, at 
the margin, consumers eat more food away from home than they do at home. 
The excessive caloric consumption when eating FAFH is reported in Figures 2.1-
3. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the effect of an away from home breakfast on caloric intake. 
The vertical axis is the average breakfast calories. The left bar is the average number of 
calories conditional on a food at home breakfast, and the right bar is the average number 
of calories conditional on a FAFH breakfast. In the calculation of the average breakfast 
calories conditional on an at home breakfast, we omit consumers who skipped breakfast 
to avoid an upward bias of the effect of FAFH on caloric intake. On average, consumers 
ingest 377 calories from an at home breakfast, but they ingest 692 calories from FAFH 
breakfast. Figure 2.2 demonstrates the effect of an away from home lunch. Lunch at 
home averages 525 calories while lunch away from home averages 803 calories. 
Similarly, at home dinner increases caloric intake by 730 on average compared to an 
away from home dinner, which increases caloric intake by 988 calories on average as 




The model will first explain the theory of cognitive dissonance and its 
implications to determine the compensating behavior for FAFH by changing behavior 
during other meals. Then, the model will present the empirical counterpart to test our 
hypothesis of the compensating behavior. 
2.3.1. Theoretical Model: Theory of Cognitive Dissonance  
The theory of cognitive dissonance was developed by the social psychologist 
Leon Festinger (1962). Cognitive dissonance is defined as disutility that occurs when 
beliefs contradict behaviors. This theory hypothesizes that consumers tend to reject the 
state of cognitive dissonance and take steps to achieve cognitive consonance.5 To resolve 
dissonance, consumers can change beliefs or behaviors or add a new cognition. For 
example, a person knows that smoking is bad but continues to smoke. He or she can 
resolve dissonance by thinking that the negative impacts of smoking are overstated, 
quitting smoking, or thinking that he or she will gain weight when quitting. Economists 
and other social scientists have implemented the theory of cognitive dissonance. For 
example, Akerlof and Dickens (1982) apply the theory of cognitive dissonance in their 
discussion of safety regulations in hazardous jobs.6 Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson, and 
Miller (1992) use the theory of cognitive dissonance in their discussion of water 
conservation. 
                                                 
5 Consonance is the terminology used by Festinger. However, it is similar to cognitive consistency or 
cognitive equilibrium (Festinger, 1962). 
6 Akerlof and Dickens (1982) also use the theory of cognitive dissonance to discuss sources of innovation, 




The theory of cognitive dissonance predicts that the level of dissonance is 
proportional to the importance of the conflicting cognition, so that the greater the 
dissonance, the greater the actions to resolve it. Consumers consider a set of cognitions, 
nutrition, price, taste, convenience and socializing when eating FAFH. In general, price 
and nutrition can be the conflicting cognitions, but the investigation of offsetting calories 
considers nutrition as the conflicting cognition. When price is inconsistent with eating 
out, consumers do not necessarily resolve dissonance by reducing caloric intake during 
other meals. They might alter their behavior by consuming cheaper food regardless of 
calories. 
There is a general agreement that FAFH is less nutritious than food at home, but 
consumers still eat it. The level of dissonance will be proportional to the importance of 
nutrition. If nutrition is important to consumers, dissonance is higher, and so is the 
intensity of their actions to compensate for FAFH during other meals to resolve the 
dissonance. In contrast, if nutrition is not important, dissonance is minimal, and 
consumers do not compensate for FAFH. Overall, the empirical analysis of estimating the 
compensating behavior will demonstrate the disagreement between nutrition and eating 
FAFH. 
2.3.2. Empirical Model  
To show how consumers would compensate for FAFH in an ideal world would 
require collecting a random sample. Consumers in this sample would have either positive 
or negative beliefs regarding the nutrition of FAFH in comparison to food at home.  
Those with negative beliefs would be assigned to a treatment group, and those with 
positive beliefs would be assigned to a control group. When all consumers ate FAFH, we 
15 
 
would expect dissonance to be higher, and the compensatory behavior to be more 
pronounced for consumers in the treatment group than for those in the control group. In 
reality, such a randomized experiment is costly to conduct and might not be 
representative.  
The dependent variable is the caloric intake at a given meal, breakfast, lunch, and 
dinner as shown in Equations 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, respectively.7 (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005) 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005) (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005) (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005) 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005)  
 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝛽𝛽01 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽21𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽31𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 
(2.1) 
 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝛽𝛽02 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽22𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽32𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, (2.2) 
 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝛽𝛽03 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽23𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽33𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘3 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3. (2.3) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes calories ingested by consumer 𝑖𝑖 on day 𝑡𝑡 for meal 𝑚𝑚,  𝐵𝐵  denotes an 
away from home breakfast, 𝐿𝐿 denotes an away from home lunch, 𝐷𝐷 denotes an away 
from home dinner, 𝑋𝑋 denotes other controls, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 denotes unobserved heterogeneity, and 𝜖𝜖 
denotes the error term. 𝛽𝛽’s are the coefficients to be estimated. 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡 are the subscripts 
for consumers and the day of food intake;  𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁 and 𝑡𝑡 is equal to 1 for the first 
day of food intake and 2 for the second day of food intake. 𝑚𝑚 = 1,2, and 3 are for 
                                                 
7 The percentages of those who did not have breakfast, lunch, and dinner are 17, 25, and 10%, respectively. 




breakfast, lunch, and dinner, respectively.  𝑘𝑘 is the subscript for other control variables’ 
coefficients, 𝑘𝑘 > 3. Since consumers tend to eat differently on weekends (McCracken & 
Brandt, 1987), we add a dummy variable that equals 1 if the day of intake was either 
Friday, Saturday, or Sunday. Some days, consumers might experience a different eating 
pattern such as when traveling, so we control for a day fixed effect (whether day one or 
two). 
Estimating equations 2.1-3 using OLS provides inconsistent estimates due to 
sample selection bias that results from the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity 
and independent variables.8 Those who have strong preferences for high-calorie meals 
tend to eat more FAFH and compensate less. Failing to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity will underestimate the compensatory behavior. We estimate equations 2.1-
3 using a fixed effect model to control for unobserved heterogeneity.9 
Breaking down the calories eaten for breakfast, lunch, and dinner allows 
determining the effect of FAFH on caloric intake occasion within equations and allows 
determining how consumers change their behavior during other meals. Another 
advantage is to investigate the ability of consumers to pre-compensate and post-
compensate for FAFH. For example, can a consumer pre-compensate for an away from 
home lunch at breakfast and post-compensate at dinner?   
                                                 
8 We do not estimate equations 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 as a system of equations because we have the same set of 
independent variables in each equation. Thus, the results of the system of equations are similar to those of 
estimating the equations separately (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).  
9 Equations 2.1-3 can be estimated using a first difference OLS. However, since each panel has only two 
observations a fixed effect estimator and first difference estimator generate the same results (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2005).    
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Different demographic groups exert different eating patterns regarding FAFH. 
Male and obese consumers tend to eat more FAFH than female and non-obese consumers 
(J. K. Binkley, 2006; McCracken & Brandt, 1987). Mancino et al. (2009) estimate the 
effect of FAFH on caloric intake for males compared to females, and obese consumers 
compared to the healthy weight consumers. Their results indicate that the effect is higher 
among male and obese consumers. We estimate equations 2.1-3, separately, for males 
and females, and separately, for obese and healthy weight consumers. We expect 
dissonance to be higher among males and obese, as well as the compensatory behavior.10 
To measure obesity, we use the Body Mass Index (BMI), defined as weight in kilograms 
divided by the square of height in meter (kg/m2).11 Obese consumers are those with BMI 
≥ 30, and healthy weight consumers are those with BMI < 25. Panel C of Table 2.1 
provides summary statistics for these groups. On average, the sample is 48% male, 36% 
obese and 31% healthy weight. The share of obese consumers compared to the share of 
healthy weight consumers indicates the high prevalence of obesity. 
The frequency of eating FAFH is expected to affect dissonance and compensating 
for FAFH during other meals. We expect consumers with a high frequency of eating 
FAFH to experience greater levels of cognitive dissonance and compensate more. The 
NHANES provides information on the frequency of the weekly away from home meals 
consumed, with a median equal to three FAFH meal/week. Since there is no measure 
calling for the high frequency of eating FAFH, we consider eating more than three FAFH 
                                                 
10 Other groups that are less likely to eat FAFH might also compensate more. For example, age and 
education are negatively correlated with FAFH (J. K. Binkley, 2006; Stewart et al., 2004), but as 
consumers grow older or obtain more knowledge, they are expected to compensate more. 
11 Weight and high are measured, not self-reported. 
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meals a week as defining the high frequency of FAFH, and eating fewer than three FAFH 
meal/week as defining the low frequency of eating FAFH. 
2.4. Results 
The results indicate that people compensate for FAFH by changing their 
behaviors during other meals. In Table 2.2, we estimate equations 2.1-3 using OLS as 
appearing in columns 1-3 and a fixed effect estimator as appearing in columns 4-6. The 
dependent variable is the number of calories ingested at a given meal. To compensate for 
FAFH, consumers would simply ingest more calories when eating FAFH. The results in 
Table 2.2 show evidence of overeating. FAFH increases breakfast energy by 378 calories, 
lunch energy by 442 calories, and dinner energy by 394 calories. To test our hypothesis 
of the compensating behavior, we compare the effect of FAFH meals across regressions 
as reported in Table 2.2. On average, consumers forgo 149 calories at lunch to 
compensate for FAFH breakfast. To compensate for FAFH lunch, consumers forgo 37 
calories at breakfast and 144 calories for dinner. Because the NHANES does not provide 
food intake information for consecutive days, we cannot determine post-compensation 
for an away from home dinner, although the results show evidence of pre-compensating 
for a FAFH dinner by 79 calories during lunch. 
For breakfast and lunch equations, the OLS results underestimate the 
compensatory behavior because consumers’ preferences for high caloric intake are 
negatively correlated with their compensatory behavior. We use a fixed effect estimator 
to account for the unobserved heterogeneity. For all three equations, we perform the 
Hausman test to determine correlations between the unobserved heterogeneity and 
independent variables. For breakfast and lunch equations, we reject the null hypothesis of 
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no correlation. However, for dinner, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between the independent variables and the unobserved heterogeneity, though this might 
be because of our inability to determine post-compensation for FAFH dinners. 
We hypothesized that consumers compensate for FAFH by changing behavior 
during other meals. The results provide evidence for the compensating behavior. 
Consumers either pre-compensate or post-compensate or both. Pre-compensation for 
FAFH is not a surprising result because there are many situations when eating FAFH is 
planned, such as social meetings held in restaurants. Expecting to eat out does not 
necessarily imply that consumers know in advance the exact meal they will eat. As a 
result, post-compensation for FAFH is greater in magnitude than pre-compensation. 
The results indicate partial compensation for FAFH: There are two reasons why 
these results do not state full compensation. First, reducing caloric intake during other 
meals is not the only mean to offset FAFH. A person can engage in physical activities to 
make up for the excessive calories. Second, not all restaurants provide nutritional 
information, unlike eating at home where most food items come with nutritional labels 
and consumers even control all ingredients. This issue of asymmetric information away 
from home might make offsetting FAFH insufficient.  
Some might relate the compensating behavior to satiety and argue that when 
exceeding the desired caloric intake due to eating FAFH, satiety makes people reduces 
energy consumption in the following meals (Anderson & Matsa, 2011). However, the 
theory of cognitive dissonance is superior to satiety in demonstrating the compensating 
behavior. Satiety might explain post-compensating for FAFH but cannot justify pre-
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compensating. Our results based on the theory of cognitive dissonance show that 
consumers either pre-compensate or post-compensate or both. Satiety also differs based 
on protein, carbohydrates, and fat, restricting offsetting FAFH to meals that contain 
highly satiating components (protein > carbohydrates > fat) (Chambers, McCrickerd, & 
Yeomans, 2015). Nonetheless, the theory of cognitive dissonance does not impose any 
restriction on different combinations of protein, carbohydrates, and fat. 
The results in Table 2.2 also show that FAFH compensation occurs either at the 
immediate following or the immediate previous meal. For example, eating an away from 
home breakfast has a negative and significant effect on lunch but not on dinner. The 
reason is that choosing a meal is a difficult process, which involves many factors such as 
biological factors (e.g., hunger), economic factors (e.g., income), social factors (e.g., 
family, religion), and knowledge (e.g., beliefs) (The European Food Information Council, 
2005). This difficulty might deplete the cognitive ability to compensate for a meal that 
was eaten far earlier in the day. 
The differences between males and females regarding compensating for FAFH 
are reported in Table 2.3. Columns 1-3 indicate the three meal occasions for males and 
columns 4-6 indicate the three meal occasions for females. Males overeat when eating a 
FAFH breakfast by 413 calories but compensate for it during lunch by 191 calories. 
When eating a FAFH lunch, males overeat by 518 calories but pre-compensate by 41 
calories during breakfast and post-compensate during dinner by 173 calories. For males, a 
FAFH dinner also increases caloric intake by 480 calories but decreases lunch calories by 
104 as an indication of pre-compensation. Similarly, for females, FAFH exerts a positive 
effect on breakfast, lunch, and dinner energy consumption by 325, 362, and 301 calories, 
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respectively. However, females pre-compensate for a FAFH lunch during breakfast by 31 
calories and post-compensate during dinner by 106 calories. Females pre-compensate for 
a FAFH dinner during lunch by 43 calories. The results in Table 2.3 have the expected 
patterns. As predicted, the compensating behavior is more pronounced in males than 
females for two reasons. First, being a male is associated with higher FAFH 
consumption. Second, males ingest more calories than females when eating FAFH. Both 
reasons arouse cognitive dissonance and intensify the actions of compensating for FAFH. 
Given the accusation that FAFH contributes to obesity, we estimate the 
compensatory behavior for consumers with a healthy weight (BMI < 25) and obese (BMI 
≥ 30) as appearing in Table 2.4. Regardless of the weight status, consumers ingest more 
calories when eating away from home, indicating a consistency with the economic 
justification of overeating away from home mentioned earlier. Because of the high 
association of FAFH with obesity, we expected the compensatory behavior to be more 
pronounced among obese consumers. The results in Table 2.4 meet our expectations. 
Obese consumers compensate for FAFH eaten at breakfast, lunch, and dinner, whereas 
healthy weight consumers only compensate for FAFH lunch. 
Finally, we estimate differences in the compensatory behavior based on the 
frequency of eating FAFH. High frequent FAFH consumers experience a higher level of 
dissonance than low frequent consumers do. We estimate equations 2.1-3 for low 
frequent FAFH consumers, eating fewer than three FAFH meal/week, and high frequent 
FAFH consumers, eating more than three FAFH meal/week. The results in Table 2.5 
meet our expectations. High frequent FAFH patrons excessively ingest more calories 
when eating away from home than low frequent FAFH consumers do. Nevertheless, the 
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compensatory behavior is more pronounced in high frequent FAFH patrons. For example, 
high frequent FAFH consumers compensate for FAFH breakfast by 191 calories while 
low frequent FAFH consumers do not compensate for FAFH breakfast. 
2.5. Robustness check 
FAFH is high in sugar, carbohydrates, fat, and salt (Lin & Cuthrie, 2012; Todd et 
al., 2010). These components are addictive (Gearhardt et al., 2009; Soto-Escageda et al., 
2016). If addiction prevents consumers from compensating for FAFH during other meals, 
the results mentioned in the earlier section of the paper cannot be consistent with the 
theory of cognitive dissonance. There might be a systemic error, even after controlling 
for the individual fixed effect, which is correlated with FAFH meals and differently 
affects energy levels for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. We estimate equations 2.1-3 for fat, 
sugar, carbohydrates, and sodium to determine whether addiction prevents the 
compensatory behavior. Fat, sugar, and carbohydrates are measured in grams (gm). 
Sodium is measured in milligrams (mg). 
Table 2.6 demonstrates the results of compensating for FAFH fat. The dependent 
variable is the amount of fat in gm. One gm of fat has 9 calories. For all three meals, 
consumers increase fat consumption when eating FAFH but compensate for the high fat 
consumption associated with FAFH. For example, FAFH breakfast increases fat 
consumption by 20 gm but consumers compensate for it by eating 6 gm less of fat during 
lunch. The results of compensating for FAFH sugar appear in Table 2.7, where 1 gm of 
sugar contains 4 calories. For breakfast, lunch, and dinner, consumers ingest more sugar 
when eating FAFH but compensate for the excess amount of sugar associated with FAFH 
during other meals. To illustrate, FAFH breakfast increases the sugar consumption by 12 
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gm. However, consumers compensate for it by reducing the amount of sugar by 7 gm 
during lunch. 
Table 2.8 shows the results for compensating for FAFH carbohydrates, in which a 
gm of carbohydrate contains 4 calories. For all meals, the results indicate that consumers 
ingest more carbohydrates when eating FAFH and compensate for their overconsumption 
of carbohydrates during other meals in the day. For instance, when eating FAFH 
breakfast, consumers increase carbohydrate consumption by 33 gm but compensate for it 
later during lunch by eating 18 gm less of carbohydrates. The results of compensating for 
FAFH sodium appear in Table 2.9. For all three meal occasions, consumers’ behaviors 
demonstrate an overconsumption of sodium as a result of eating FAFH as well as the 
compensating behavior by altering their consumption patterns during other meals. For 
example, eating a FAFH breakfast increases sodium consumption by 771 mg, but 
consumers reduce lunch sodium by 332 mg. 
Compensating for FAFH fat, sugar, carbohydrates, and sodium indicates that 
addiction does not prevent consumers from altering their behavior during other meals. 
The results are consistent with the theory of cognitive dissonance, and not due to a 
systemic error that is correlated with FAFH meals and has different effects on breakfast, 
lunch, and dinner energy consumption. Furthermore, we run a placebo test as appearing 
in Table 2.10. The dependent variable is the number of calories consumed at a particular 
meal. It is impossible to imagine that drinking water has the same effect as FAFH. We 
use the amount of plain water measured in gm instead of a FAFH breakfast in equation 
2.1, instead of a FAFH lunch in equation 2.2, and instead of a FAFH dinner in the 
equation 2.3. Hence, there is no effect of water on energy consumption. In sum, our 
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placebo test shows more evidence that FAFH, which is contrary to beliefs, creates a state 
of cognitive dissonance. 
2.6. Conclusion 
Food-Away-From-Home (FAFH) appears to be of poor diet quality because it is 
high in calories; thus, it is often blamed for the high prevalence of obesity in the United 
States. We hypothesize that consumers compensate for FAFH by changing their 
behaviors during other meals. To test this hypothesis, we use data from the 2009-10 
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES). The results support our 
hypothesis of the compensating behavior. Consumers are able to reduce energy 
consumption during other meals to trade off the excessive caloric intake typically 
associated with FAFH. Consumers can change their behaviors either before or after 
eating FAFH or both. For example, consumers change their behaviors during breakfast 
and dinner to compensate for FAFH lunch. 
 Restricting FAFH is less warranted when consumers can compensate for the 
excessive caloric intake from the consumption of FAFH during other meals. FAFH 
restrictions might affect consumers’ welfare for four reasons. First, restricting FAFH 
implies considering only nutrition. Besides nutrition, a food shopper simultaneously 
considers other aspects of food consumption such as price, taste, and convenience, 
weighs the utility of each, and then considers the one that gives him or her the most 
utility. For example, imagine that a health-conscious consumer forgets to bring lunch to 
work. The only options are to return home and get it or to buy a high-calorie meal from 
the workplace cafeteria. In this situation, convenience will outweigh nutrition more if the 
opportunity cost of time is high, and the consumer will offset the high caloric intake of 
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lunch by eating a lower-calorie dinner later at home. Second, restricting FAFH implies 
revising the advancements in food processing, which might be socially desirable 
(Cawley, 2015). Third, there is no single type of food that can be the only assessment of 
diet quality. Eating FAFH does not automatically entail a poor diet, and eating food at 
home does not ensure a better diet. Finally, food environment regulations such as zoning, 
taxing, or portion control (Sturm & Cohen, 2009) are not anticipated to become 
implemented nationwide because these regulations interfere with consumers’ rights to 
decide on their health and restrict the rights of businesses to expand and differentiate 
themselves. For instance, the state of Mississippi passed a law in 2013 that prevented 
controlling food portions (Fox News, 2013). 
We also elucidate the cognitive aspects of the compensating behavior. Consumers 
believe that FAFH is less nutritious than food at home, but they still demand it because of 
price, taste, convenience, or socializing. We implement the theory of cognitive 
dissonance introduced by Festinger (1962)  to explain how the negative beliefs about 
FAFH conflict with consumers’ actions of eating FAFH and thus, create a state of 
cognitive dissonance. To resolve cognitive dissonance, consumers compensate for 
consumption of FAFH by altering behavior during other meals. 
 Since the compensating behavior is an action to resolve dissonance, we suggest 
redirecting policies toward manipulating cognitive dissonance rather than restricting the 
availability of FAFH. As an illustration of dissonance manipulation, in their discussion of 
water conservation, Dickerson et al. (1992) arouse cognitive dissonance in their 
experiment subjects, varying their mindfulness in water wasting behavior and their pro-
commitment to society by asking them to inspire others to conserve water. The pro-
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committed and mindful subjects experienced a greater dissonance and thus took shorter 
showers as opposed to the uncommitted subjects. 
Increasing the intensity of dissonance after eating FAFH to induce the 
compensatory behavior is one avenue policymakers should consider to promote healthy 
eating and reduce obesity. Regulations that are based on dissonance manipulation can 
nudge consumers to improve their dietary choices without dictating their choices (R. H. 
Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). Mandating the nutritional information on menus at restaurants 
and fast food establishments can influence dissonance. Even if consumers do not use the 
nutritional information to decide on what to eat, just knowing the number of calories 
ingested can arouse dissonance after eating and increase the efficacy of compensating for 
FAFH. Menu labeling could also be supplemented by providing the nutritional 
information as a reference for a meal purchased, such as printing the nutritional 
information on the back of the receipt. 
A limitation of this study is its focus on whether or not consumers compensate for 
the high caloric intake from FAFH, without assessing the efficacy of their compensation. 
To gauge the effectiveness of compensating would require information on food intake 
and physical activities for consecutive days to account for calorie consumption as well as 
expenditure. Not considering the availability of healthy food is also another limitation. 
Individuals who do not have enough access to healthy food like those who live in food 
desert areas might compensate less for FAFH. These limitations are left for future 
research.   
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Variables  Mean S.D. 
A: Beliefs relating to Food-Away-From-Home 
Fast food/pizza more nutritious 0.02 0.15 
Fast food/pizza cheaper than cooking 0.16 0.36 
Fast food/pizza tastes better 0.15 0.36 
Fast food/pizza more convenient 0.86 0.34 
Eat at fast food places to socialize 0.47 0.50 
Restaurant food more nutritious 0.04 0.19 
Restaurant food cheaper than cooking 0.06 0.23 
Restaurant food tastes better 0.33 0.47 
Restaurant food more convenient 0.69 0.46 
Eat at a restaurant to socialize 0.85 0.36 
B: Actions relating to Food-Away-From-Home 
Daily away from home meals 0.58 0.71 
Away from home breakfast 0.08 0.27 
Away from home lunch 0.24 0.43 
Away from home dinner 0.26 0.44 
Weekly away from home meals  4.00 3.92 
C: Subgroups 
Male 0.48 0.50 
Healthy weight 0.31 0.46 
Obese 0.36 0.48 
Observations are weighted using the NHANES sample weights. 
N = 7,538 
28 
 





























Without FAFH breakfast With FAFH breakfast
29 
 
Figure 2.2: The effect of an away from home lunch on caloric intake 
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Table 2.2: The results of compensating for Food-Away-From-Home calories during other meals 
 OLS Fixed Effect 
Variables 
Energy (kcal) Energy (kcal) 
Breakfast Lunch Dinner Breakfast Lunch Dinner 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Away from home breakfast 385.299*** -112.258*** 5.929 378.490*** -149.248*** -68.706 
 (23.052) (25.814) (36.245) (27.364) (39.111) (47.822) 
Away from home lunch -33.377*** 456.021*** -125.054*** -36.516** 441.819*** -143.969*** 
 (10.654) (18.193) (19.683) (14.737) (25.252) (29.179) 
Away from home dinner -36.719*** -52.524*** 364.830*** -12.737 -78.830*** 394.283*** 
 (10.195) (15.026) (23.598) (13.277) (21.050) (30.903) 
Weekend 38.165*** -11.979 -9.846 45.850*** -13.348 6.308 
 (10.405) (13.517) (18.011) (9.800) (14.939) (17.770) 
Day fixed effect -39.023*** -14.567 -7.040 -39.355*** -14.615 -8.122 
 (8.614) (11.918) (15.286) (8.609) (11.910) (15.296) 
Constant 328.436*** 388.000*** 667.607*** 320.270*** 401.707*** 663.660*** 
 (8.978) (10.985) (14.825) (6.899) (9.579) (12.842) 
Observations 7,538 7,538 7,538 7,538 7,538 7,538 
R-squared 0.116 0.196 0.089 0.143 0.203 0.124 










Energy (kcal) Energy (kcal) 
Breakfast Lunch Dinner Breakfast Lunch Dinner 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Away from home breakfast 412.966*** -191.251*** -74.394 324.752*** -71.717 -75.208 
 (38.113) (54.973) (71.647) (34.575) (49.264) (54.615) 
Away from home lunch -41.468* 518.419*** -172.798*** -31.182* 361.720*** -106.208*** 
 (23.234) (42.017) (47.919) (18.117) (25.086) (31.551) 
Away from home dinner -21.039 -104.368*** 480.024*** -6.409 -43.231* 301.318*** 
 (20.762) (34.133) (52.209) (16.043) (22.724) (29.890) 
Weekend 58.258*** 1.756 13.027 35.146*** -25.600* 0.073 
 (16.393) (27.494) (31.901) (11.425) (14.516) (17.504) 
Day fixed effect -45.020*** -5.373 -1.828 -32.897*** -24.515* -12.588 
 (14.630) (20.545) (26.849) (9.465) (12.606) (15.636) 
Constant 356.094*** 445.392*** 793.349*** 286.656*** 356.012*** 543.349*** 
 (12.293) (16.411) (23.475) (7.416) (10.650) (12.867) 
Observations 3,614 3,614 3,614 3,924 3,924 3,924 
R-squared 0.157 0.219 0.139 0.122 0.195 0.113 










Obese (BMI ≥ 30 (kg/m2)) Healthy weight (BMI < 25 (kg/m2)) 
Energy (kcal) Energy (kcal) 
Breakfast Lunch Dinner Breakfast Lunch Dinner 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Away from home breakfast 386.837*** -149.284*** -77.221 393.443*** -121.823 29.899 
 (39.784) (48.079) (64.556) (63.426) (79.815) (67.342) 
Away from home lunch -68.429*** 450.347*** -149.315*** -15.412 448.071*** -101.626** 
 (25.801) (39.294) (46.050) (31.221) (40.692) (42.500) 
Away from home dinner -12.435 -113.237*** 343.017*** -27.051 -19.031 300.799*** 
 (23.242) (34.824) (51.944) (25.430) (36.790) (43.643) 
Weekend 44.403*** -12.818 30.256 34.410* -14.241 -8.708 
 (15.813) (24.873) (28.519) (18.725) (25.321) (27.085) 
Day fixed effect -18.809 -10.218 -24.096 -67.227*** -18.056 12.917 
 (13.510) (17.849) (27.104) (16.195) (21.287) (23.294) 
Constant 321.657*** 397.238*** 693.696*** 333.004*** 375.623*** 618.709*** 
 (11.438) (13.998) (21.133) (13.137) (17.686) (18.793) 
Observations 2,892 2,892 2,892 2,196 2,196 2,196 
R-squared 0.175 0.241 0.097 0.136 0.198 0.090 










< 3 away from home meal/week > 3 away from home meal/week 
Energy (kcal) Energy (kcal) 
Breakfast Lunch Dinner Breakfast Lunch Dinner 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Away from home breakfast 362.327*** -37.400 -86.301 390.362*** -190.968*** -48.788 
 (44.927) (57.088) (78.380) (34.193) (53.962) (65.677) 
Away from home lunch -17.132 395.040*** -124.365*** -58.697** 479.421*** -157.509*** 
 (19.302) (36.920) (45.693) (23.567) (38.750) (43.485) 
Away from home dinner -4.297 -70.679*** 354.999*** -22.346 -74.497** 419.505*** 
 (17.232) (26.940) (42.469) (21.024) (35.243) (50.845) 
Weekend 45.125*** -26.949 11.052 57.242*** -4.514 -15.058 
 (13.407) (21.004) (23.742) (16.989) (25.824) (30.716) 
Day fixed effect -51.154*** -24.546 10.771 -34.081** -1.734 -13.779 
 (11.023) (16.216) (20.400) (15.580) (20.315) (26.498) 
Constant 318.956*** 399.804*** 632.601*** 326.488*** 400.898*** 690.904*** 
 (7.444) (10.458) (15.304) (14.698) (19.382) (25.062) 
Observations 3,704 3,704 3,704 2,758 2,758 2,758 
R-squared 0.111 0.139 0.102 0.176 0.261 0.142 








 Fat (gm)  
Breakfast Lunch Dinner 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
Away from home breakfast 19.799*** -5.781*** -3.581 
 (1.619) (1.932) (2.216) 
Away from home lunch -1.207 17.046*** -8.298*** 
 (0.758) (1.146) (1.407) 
Away from home dinner -0.092 -4.436*** 17.101*** 
 (0.689) (1.047) (1.495) 
Weekend 2.610*** 0.424 0.598 
 (0.476) (0.782) (0.863) 
Day fixed effect -0.920** -0.033 0.778 
 (0.450) (0.604) (0.763) 
Constant 10.163*** 18.545*** 29.128*** 
 (0.374) (0.481) (0.664) 
Observations 7,538 7,538 7,538 
R-squared 0.137 0.132 0.107 










Breakfast Lunch Dinner 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
Away from home breakfast 11.604*** -6.663** -2.551 
 (2.306) (2.742) (2.256) 
Away from home lunch -2.264* 15.354*** -1.304 
 (1.312) (1.957) (1.652) 
Away from home dinner 0.002 -3.911** 11.048*** 
 (1.189) (1.736) (1.676) 
Weekend 1.330 -0.406 1.266 
 (0.891) (1.165) (1.072) 
Day fixed effect -1.822*** 0.229 1.008 
 (0.684) (0.852) (0.842) 
Constant 24.387*** 19.768*** 24.002*** 
 (0.592) (0.671) (0.720) 
Observations 7,538 7,538 7,538 
R-squared 0.028 0.064 0.031 





Table 2.8: The results of compensating for Food-Away-From-Home carbohydrates 




Breakfast Lunch Dinner 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
Away from home breakfast 32.877*** -17.609*** -7.814 
 (3.707) (5.125) (4.987) 
Away from home lunch -6.138*** 40.195*** -8.396*** 
 (2.202) (3.278) (2.990) 
Away from home dinner -2.089 -8.951*** 32.927*** 
 (1.946) (2.914) (3.335) 
Weekend 3.041** -0.645 2.578 
 (1.410) (1.950) (2.070) 
Day fixed effect -6.144*** 0.410 2.837* 
 (1.218) (1.511) (1.693) 
Constant 51.795*** 52.687*** 72.528*** 
 (1.020) (1.211) (1.422) 
Observations 7,538 7,538 7,538 
R-squared 0.070 0.123 0.069 










Breakfast Lunch Dinner 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
Away from home breakfast 771.141*** -332.376*** -70.085 
 (59.823) (85.649) (103.480) 
Away from home lunch -57.037** 718.608*** -295.434*** 
 (25.219) (53.673) (63.108) 
Away from home dinner -25.150 -168.435*** 550.753*** 
 (22.516) (47.438) (64.494) 
Weekend 101.663*** 4.015 30.597 
 (18.319) (35.085) (39.228) 
Day fixed effect -46.985*** -18.393 47.433 
 (15.674) (28.164) (34.243) 
Constant 425.075*** 1,000.999*** 1,506.076*** 
 (12.575) (22.289) (28.463) 
Observations 7,538 7,538 7,538 
R-squared 0.152 0.111 0.060 





Table 2.10: The results of the placebo test 
 Energy (kcal) 
 Breakfast Lunch Dinner 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
Plain water (gm) -0.003 0.016 -0.030 
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.022) 
Away from home breakfast No Yes Yes 
Away from home lunch Yes No Yes 
Away from home dinner Yes Yes No 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,538 7,538 7,538 
R-squared 0.025 0.022 0.014 





Chapter 3: The Mindlessness and Mindfulness of Secondary Eating 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Since 1975, the prevalence of obesity in the U.S. has rapidly increased; 
approximately two in three adults are either overweight or obese (U.S. Department of 
Agricultural, 2016b). In response, researchers have investigated the factors driving excess 
body weight. Secondary eating is one of those factors. Especially since the mid-1970s, 
secondary eating has increased along with obesity (Zick & Stevens, 2011). Secondary 
eating is defined as eating while doing something else like working or driving. Someone 
who is secondarily eating might not be able to monitor the quantity (Wansink, 2007). 
Bellisle and Dalix (2001) show that secondary eating, unlike primary eating, leads to 
overeating. 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of secondary eating on 
obesity. Becker’s household production theory explains consumers’ choices regarding 
time allocation (Becker, 1965), and health production (Chen, Shogren, Orazem, & 
Crocker, 2002; Grossman, 1972, 2003; Huffman, 2011; Kalenkoski & Hamrick, 2013). 
Based on the household production theory, health production and time allocated to eating 
are affected by economic factors. A high wage increases the opportunity cost of time, 
suggesting that those consumers engage in secondary eating to save time (Hamermesh, 
2010). In addition, a high wage increases the expected value of future income (J. Binkley, 





The literature discusses secondary eating time from several angles. Some studies 
investigate the effect of economic factors on secondary eating time (Senia, Jensen, & 
Zhylyevskyy, 2014). Other studies investigate the effect of secondary eating time on 
body weight (Bertrand & Schanzenbach, 2009; Hamermesh, 2010; Kolodinsky & 
Goldstein, 2011; Zick, Stevens, & Bryant, 2011). Studies that investigate the effect of 
secondary eating on obesity are inconclusive. Some studies find a negative effect of 
secondary eating on body weight (Hamermesh, 2010; Zick et al., 2011), whereas other 
studies find a positive effect (Bertrand & Schanzenbach, 2009). Except for Bertrand and 
Schanzenbach (2009), previous studies assume that secondary eating similarly affects all 
consumers, leading to overeating and obesity. This paper relaxes the assumption that 
secondary eating similarly affects consumers, identifying situations when secondary 
eating has a positive relationship with body weight, which we call “mindless,” and 
situations when secondary eating has an inverse relationship with body weight, or 
“mindful.” We hypothesize that lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating on 
body weight. Inactive consumers are more likely to engage in mindless secondary eating 
than those who are physically active. 
 We use data from the 2006-08 American Time Use Survey (ATUS). A 
subsample of consumers who participated in the Current Population Survey (CPS) was 
randomly selected to provide diaries of all activities starting from 4:00 am the day before 
the interview. The Eating and Heath Module contains information on secondary eating. 
There are two avenues in which lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating on 
obesity. First, the analysis controls for sedentary leisure activities and physical activities. 




more than watching TV for half an hour does. Second, the analysis controls for the type 
of the primary task. The intuition is that the effect of eating while driving might differ 
from eating while watching TV. 
The results provide evidence that lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary 
eating on obesity. Maintaining a sedentary lifestyle increases the odds of mindless 
secondary eating, and therefore contributes to the obesity epidemic. Consumers who eat 
while doing stationary activities are susceptible to mindless secondary eating as opposed 
to those who eat while doing less stationary activities. Our findings resolve the issue of 
the mixed results of previous studies that focus on the effect of secondary eating on 
obesity. Moreover, our results inform policies to better target people who have a 
sedentary lifestyle, to help them develop a healthier one. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the data 
used for the analysis and the model. Section 3.3 provides the results, and Section 3.4 
concludes. 
3.2. Data and Model 
We use data from the 2006-8 American Time Use Survey (ATUS). A proportion 
of participants in the Current Population Survey (CPS) aged 15 years or older was 
selected to provide diaries of all activities for 24 hours, starting at 4:00 am the day before 
the interview. The Eating and Health Module provides information on secondary eating 
and drinking and on weight and height. After reporting all activities, participants were 
asked if they ate while doing other activities. The same questions were asked about 




water while doing something else. Obesity is measured by Body Mass Index (BMI) 
which is weight in kilograms divided by the square of height in meters (kg/m2). BMI is 
calculated from self-reported height and weight, so there might be some measurement 
errors. Even though it is not uncommon to use self-reported BMI (Hamermesh, 2010; 
Zick et al., 2011), there is no consensus on the validity of self-reported height and weight. 
Kuczmarski, Kuczmarski, and Najjar (2001) find that self-reported BMI is valid for 
younger adults. Merrill and Richardson (2009) and Cawley and Burkhauser (2006) find 
self-reported BMI to be underestimated. To correct self-reported BMI, Cawley and 
Burkhauser (2006) suggest using information from the National Health and Nutritional 
Examination Survey (NHANES). For each observation, the NHANES provides two 
values of weight and height; one is self-reported, and the other is measured. 
Courtemanche, Heutel, and McAlvanah (2015) follow this correction method but find 
that both the self-reported and corrected BMI provide almost the same results. Thus, we 
consider the issue of self-reported BMI as trivial. 
A BMI under 18.5 is classified as underweight, between 18.5 and 24.9 is 
classified as normal weight, between 25 and 29.9 is classified as overweight, and 30 and 
above is classified as obese (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015). These 
classifications are for adults age 20 years and older, so we limit the sample to this age 
group. Retired and unemployed individuals might differ in their time allocations, so we 
omit people older than 65 years as well as those who are not working. 
It should be noted that being underweight, like being overweight, has negative 
impacts on health, so we omit underweight consumers. Leisure sedentary activities are 




2008), including watching TV, reading, computer use, video and board games, and 
sedentary commute (Dunton, Berrigan, Ballard-Barbash, Graubard, & Atienza, 2009).12 
Physical activities include all activities under the category of “sports, exercise, and 
recreation” coded in the Lexicon of the ATUS as 1301xx, in addition to active commute, 
walking and biking (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016). To ensure health generation, we 
consider only sports with a Metabolic Equivalent Rate (MET) of 3 and above (Dunton et 
al., 2009). The MET measures the intensity of activities. One MET is defined as the 
energy to sit or lay (Tudor-Locke, Washington, Ainsworth, & Troiano, 2009). To do any 
sport with MET of 3 and above, a person has to spend at least three times more energy 
than that required for sedentary activities. We define secondary eating as the total sum of 
secondary eating and secondary drinking that occurred while doing other activities. The 
total time of secondary eating and drinking was also calculated using the procedure 
suggested by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (2016). 
We use dummy variables to control for male, black, Hispanic, and other race 
individuals. The omitted groups are white and female individuals. We control for age and 
being married/cohabitating. We also control for education: high school, some college, or 
a college degree and beyond. The omitted groups are single and the education entailment 
of less than high school. We add a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if family 
income is greater than 185% of the poverty income level and 0 otherwise. We add 
another dummy variable to control for households with missing income. Since time 
allocations and eating habits differ on weekends, in different seasons, and on holidays, 
                                                 
12 Due to low variation, we omit other leisure activities: tobacco and drug use; television (religious); 
listening to the radio; listening to playing music (not radio); arts and crafts; hobbies, except arts and crafts 




we add dummy variables to control for whether the interview day was during weekend 
day, summer, or holiday. Finally, we control for the number of children ages 0-5 years 
old and 6-17 years old. 
The total number of observations is equal to 19,328. Table 3.1 presents the 
weighted summary statistics of the consumers’ characteristics. The average BMI is equal 
to 28 (kg/m2), which highlights the high prevalence of obesity. The average age of the 
sample is 41 years old. The sample consists of 56% male, 11% black, 13% Hispanic, 6% 
from other races, and 65% married individuals. Seventy-eight percent are from high-
income households. The percentages of individuals with a high school degree, some 
college, or a college degree or above is equal to 29, 29, and 34%, respectively. The 
average number of children between 0-5 years old is 0.27 child, and the average number 
of children between 6-17 years old is 0.57 child. The average percentage residing in the 
Northeast, Midwest, and West regions is 18, 25 and 22%, respectively. Also, on average, 
83% of individuals reside in metropolitan areas. 
We hypothesize that lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating on obesity. 
Secondary eating does not have a direct effect on obesity. An active person is less 
inclined to engage in mindless secondary eating, whereas an inactive person is more 
inclined to do so. We use the time that someone spends on leisure sedentary activities, 
physical activities, paid work, and sedentary commute to control for lifestyle. Leisure 
sedentary activities include watching TV, reading, playing games, using a computer, and 
socializing with others. These activities are considered to be more habitual than others 
(Neal, Wood, & Quinn, 2006). Ignoring other activities might bias our results. Other 




of secondary eating, such as attending a football game. Thus, in other specifications, we 
include all activities to reduce any possibility of omitted variable bias. 
The ATUS provides information about 438 primary activities (Tudor-Locke et al., 
2009). There are 19 major categories. Each category contains several subcategories. For 
example, the major category of the “household activities” encompasses 10 subcategories 
such as “housework.” Examples of activities under “housework” are interior cleaning and 
doing laundry. Tudor-Locke et al. (2009) develop a compendium of activities, which 
maps each activity in the ATUS to a value of a MET (Washington, 2016). 
To control for all time allocations, we use this compendium by dividing all 
activities into three groups. The first group consists of activities with (1.5 ≥ MET). The 
second group consists of activities with (1.5 < MET < 3). Activities with (MET ≥ 3) are 
contained in the third group. The rationale for choosing these thresholds is that activities 
with (1.5 ≥ MET), such as attending performing arts, playing video or board games, 
watching TV, and listening to music, are light. Light activities increase the odds of 
mindless eating. Activities with (1.5 < MET < 3) are less sedentary than the activities of 
the first group but still require more movement, such as driving an automobile. Activities 
with (MET ≥ 3) generate health; these include activities like interior or exterior cleaning, 
playing with children (not sports), and sports in general. It is implausible to expect 
engagement in secondary eating while doing the activities of the latter group increases 
body weight. 
To account for primary tasks, we break down secondary eating time into eating 




on body weight will depend on the main activity. For example, eating while watching TV 
might increase the odds of mindless secondary eating more than eating while working or 
driving. We control for all primary activities estimating the effect of secondary eating 
time while doing activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) and activities with (1.5 < MET < 3). We 
expect secondary eating while doing activities of the first group to have a positive and 
relatively high effect on BMI, whereas activities of the second group to have a positive 
and relatively low effect on BMI. 
Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics of time allocations. Panel A reports the 
summary statistics for lifestyle regarding time allocations. On average, people spend 620 
minutes doing activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) and 560 minutes doing activities with (1.5 < 
MET < 3). More specifically, people allocate 12 minutes to socializing, 126 minutes to 
watching TV, 7 minutes to playing video or board games or to using a computer, and 14 
minutes to reading. On average, people also allocate 323 minutes to work at their main 
jobs, 76 minutes to sedentary commute, and 16 minutes to physical activity. On average, 
consumers spend 80 minutes per day eating while doing other activities as shown in 
Panel B. The average secondary eating time is equal to 27 minutes while doing activities 
with (1.5 ≥ MET). Eating while doing activities with (1.5 < MET < 3) averages to 50 
minutes. The average time spent on secondary eating while doing activities of the latter 
group is higher, which highlights the importance of relaxing the assumption that 
secondary eating similarly influences body weight. If on average, people eat while doing 
activities that require movement, then it is implausible to assume that secondary eating 




For primary identification, we compare time allocations based on obesity status. 
Figure 3.1 presents the BMI kernel density distributions based on secondary eating. The 
dotted line plots the BMI distribution for those who report that they were engaging in 
secondary eating, and the solid line plots the BMI distribution of those who did not. No 
variations in secondary eating time explain variations in BMI. Figure 3.2 provides an 
example of the effect of lifestyle on obesity. Depending on watching TV, we plot the 
BMI distributions. The median amount of time spent watching TV time is 100 minutes. 
We categorize individuals who spend more than the median amount of time into the 
watch-more-TV group (dotted line), and those who spent less than the median time into 
the watch-less-TV group (solid line). Unlike the BMI distributions based on secondary 
eating, Figure 3.2 indicates that variations in time spent watching TV explain variations 
in obesity. Those who watch more TV are less likely to be at a healthy weight and more 
likely to be at an unhealthy weight. Table 3.3 presents the secondary eating mean 
differences between individuals who are obese and those who are at normal weight. On 
average, there are no statistically significant differences in secondary eating time by body 
weight. We compare the means of lifestyle regarding time allocations for obese and 
normal weight individuals as appearing in Table 3.4. On average, obese individuals are 
more likely than healthy weight individuals to maintain a sedentary lifestyle. For 
example, obese individuals spend an average of 30 more minutes watching TV every day. 
Overall, Figure 3.3 summarizes the information provided in Figures 3.1-2 and Tables 3.3-
4, which we use for the primary identification. There is no direct effect on secondary 




increases the odds of mindless secondary eating, and the opposite applies for an active 
way of life. 
We apply OLS to test how lifestyle explains the effect of secondary eating on 
BMI. Our dependent variable is BMI, and our main independent variable is secondary 
eating time. 
 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆 + 𝑋𝑋′𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖, (3.1) 
where 𝑆𝑆 denotes secondary eating time, 𝑋𝑋 denotes a vector of controls, and 𝜖𝜖 denotes the 
error term. 𝛽𝛽0, 𝛽𝛽1, and 𝛿𝛿 are the coefficients to be estimated. Equation 3.1 ignores the 
aspects of lifestyle. Then, we test the null hypothesis that secondary eating does not affect 
BMI. Rejecting the null hypothesis indicates that secondary eating has an adverse relation 
with BMI. We expand equation 3.1 to control for aspects of lifestyle. 
 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆 + 𝑍𝑍′𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖,   
(3.2) 
where Z denotes a vector of controls and includes aspects of lifestyle. These aspects are 
time spent on socializing, watching TV, playing games, using a computer, reading, 
working, sedentarily commuting, and being physically active. To determine the effect of 
lifestyle, we test the null hypothesis of no effect of secondary eating on BMI. Failing to 
reject the null hypothesis supports our hypothesis that lifestyle explains the effect of 
secondary eating on body weight. For robustness checking, we jointly test whether these 




combinations of lifestyle elements. For example, we test whether socializing and 
watching TV are jointly different from zero. We also test whether socializing, watching 
TV, playing games, using a computer, and reading are different from zero. If the model in 
Figure 3.3 is correct, we reject the null hypotheses that the combinations of lifestyle 
aspects are jointly equal to zero. In another specification, we extend equation 3.1 by 
adding two variables to control for all aspects of lifestyle. The first added variable is the 
sum of the time that someone spends doing activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) and the second is 
the sum of the time that someone spends doing activities with (1.5 < MET < 3). The 
omitted group consists of activities with (MET ≥ 3) since all three groups sum up to 24 
hours. Failure to reject the null hypothesis that secondary eating has no effect on body 
weight further demonstrate the robustnesses of our results. 
We also control for primary activities; estimating the effect of secondary eating 
while doing activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) and activities with (1.5 < MET < 3). Finally, we 
estimate how lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating on obesity among males 
and females to account for gender differences. A large proportion of secondary eating 
time takes place while working. Different job environments might affect secondary 
eating. For instance, having a desk job might increase secondary eating time, whereas 
working on a farm or doing construction might not. To account for these differences, we 
divide individuals into three groups based on their occupations: white collar, blue collar, 
and service occupations (Courtemanche et al., 2015).13  
                                                 
13 White collar occupations: Management occupations; business and financial operations occupations; 
computer and mathematical science occupations; architecture and engineering occupations; life, physical, 





For all specifications, observations are weighted using the Eating and Health 
Module sample weights. Table 3.5 presents the OLS estimates of equation 3.1, estimating 
the effect of secondary eating time on BMI. Columns 1-4 present different specifications. 
In the first specification, we control for demographic factors. In the second specification, 
we add socioeconomic factors. In column 3 we control for geographic factors. We control 
for year fixed effect, and whether the interview was on the weekend, in summer, or on a 
holiday. Holding other variables constant, secondary eating has a positive effect on BMI. 
Although the significance level is marginal, the results hold among different 
specifications. 
To test how the ways in which lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating 
on obesity, we estimate equation 3.2, which controls for different aspects of lifestyle, 
including socializing, watching TV, playing games, using a computer, reading, working, 
sedentarily commuting, and being physically active. Table 3.6 presents the OLS estimates 
using equation 3.2. Once we control for aspects of lifestyles, secondary eating becomes 
statistically insignificant. This supports our hypothesis that lifestyle moderates the effect 
of secondary eating on obesity. As reported in Table 3.6, the time that someone spends 
watching TV, playing games, using a computer, working, and sedentarily commuting is 
positively associated with BMI. In contrast, the time that someone spends on physical 
                                                 
practitioner and technical occupations; healthcare support occupations; and office and administrative 
support occupations. Blue collar occupations: Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations; 
farming, fishing, and forestry occupations; construction and extraction occupations; installation, 
maintenance, and repair occupations; production occupations; and transportation and material moving 
occupations. Service occupations: Community and social service occupations; protective service 
occupations; food preparation and serving related occupations; building and grounds cleaning and 





activities is negatively associated with BMI. To test the relevance of these lifestyle 
aspects, we perform joint hypothesis tests. Table 3.7 shows the F-values of these tests. 
The large magnitude of F-values supports the relevance of lifestyle elements. For 
example, we test the null hypothesis that socializing, watching TV, playing games, using 
a computer, and reading are jointly equal to zero. The F-value is equal to 13.06 and 
statistically significant at 1%, so we reject the null hypothesis. We run the same 
regression to demonstrate how lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating for 
demographic subgroups as reported in Table 3.8. Columns 1-2 show the results for males 
and females, and columns 3-5 show the results for white collar, blue collar, and service 
occupations. Among men and women, controlling for lifestyle aspects explains the 
effects of secondary eating on BMI. For blue collar and service occupations, controlling 
for lifestyle aspects also explains the effect of secondary eating. In among white collar 
individuals, secondary eating has a positive and significant effect on BMI even with 
controlling for lifestyle aspects. The white collar occupations are sedentary with a higher 
opportunity cost of time. 
According to the household production theory, a high opportunity cost of time 
encourages secondary eating to save time (Hamermesh, 2010) and encourages physical 
activity to maintain earning capacity (J. Binkley, 2010). The results are consistent with 
the household production theory. The negative and statistically significant coefficient of 
physical activities is six times higher in magnitude, which is more than enough to offset 
the effect of secondary eating. 
To test if these results are affected by omitted variable bias, we control for all 




MET) and (1.5 < MET < 3), as appearing in Table 3.9. Except for the female group, the 
results in Table 3.9 are consistent with the previous findings. The results in Table 3.9 
have the expected patterns. For all groups, the effects of activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) are 
higher in magnitude than those of activities with (1.5 < MET < 3) since the latter are less 
sedentary. 
To control for all primary activities, we divide secondary eating time into eating 
while doing activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) and doing activities with (1.5 < MET < 3). The 
results show that eating while doing activities of the first group increases the odds of 
mindless secondary eating (Table 3.10). The opposite is true for doing activities of the 
latter group, which are less sedentary and require some movement. 
Overall, secondary eating has no direct effect on obesity. We hypothesize that 
lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating on obesity. The results support this 
hypothesis and state two avenues in which lifestyle modulates the effect of secondary 
eating. The first avenue is through stationary activities. People who spend more time 
socializing, watching TV, reading, using a computer, playing video or board games, 
working in sedentary jobs, and sedentarily commuting are more likely to engage in 
mindless secondary eating. The second avenue is the type of primary activities in which 
secondary eating occurs. The analysis distinguishes between highly-and-less sedentary 
activities. Those who engage in secondary eating while doing activities of the former type 
are more susceptible to mindless secondary eating. In contrast, consumers who eat while 





 Since the mid-1970s, obesity has rapidly increased in the U.S.; approximately 
two in three adults are either overweight or obese. Secondary eating is one factor that has 
been blamed for obesity. Secondary eating is defined as eating while doing something 
else such as reading or watching TV. While engaging in secondary eating, consumers 
might not be able to monitor the amount of food eaten, leading to overeating and obesity. 
Previous studies have assumed that secondary eating affects body weight similarly and 
shown mixed results of the effect of secondary eating. Our contribution was to relax this 
assumption, identifying situations in which “mindless secondary eating” positively 
affects body weight and situations where “mindful secondary eating” negatively affects 
body weight. 
We hypothesize that lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating on obesity. 
Using data from the 2006-8 American Time Use Survey (ATUS), the results show that 
spending more time doing sedentary activities increases the odds of mindless secondary 
eating, leading to overeating and obesity. Furthermore, the analysis also demonstrates 
that eating while doing highly sedentary activities increases the chances for mindless 
secondary eating, but eating while doing less sedentary activities discourages it. 
Our findings resolve the issue of the mixed results of previous studies, which 
consider secondary eating mindless (not mindful) leading to overeating and obesity. 
When we control for lifestyle, secondary eating time becomes statistically insignificant. 
Thus, policies that aim at reducing obesity should consider lifestyle as the real issue (not 




active way of life. For example, improving sidewalks and running tracks might encourage 
people to be more active and discourage mindless secondary eating.  
Although we control for all activities in the ATUS, there might be an endogeneity 
issue: A sedentary lifestyle increases the odds of mindless secondary eating and obesity, 
but obesity also increases the chances of sedentary activities and secondary eating. Future 
research should consider using different data, which are less challenging to obtain valid 
Instrumental Variables or similar strategies to identify a causal relationship. We also did 
not directly measure mindless secondary eating, where people do not pay attention to the 
quantity, and mindful secondary eating, when they do so. To measure mindless and 
mindful secondary eating would require information of food environment. The ATUS is 
only a time use data that does not have information on food environment.14Accordingly, 
we focus on aspects of lifestyle. Future researchers should directly measure mindless and 
mindful secondary eating. To illustrate, suppose two people have desk jobs and enjoy 
snacking on potato chips while working. One person brings a small bag of potato chips 
every day, but the other keeps a family size bag in the office. If both rely on external cues 
to feel satiated (Wansink, 2007), secondary eating is supposed to be mindless when food 
is plenty and mindful when food is limited. 
  
                                                 
14 Bellisle and Dalix (2001) and Bertrand and Schanzenbach (2009) use data that have information on time 










Variables Mean S.D. 
Body Mass Index (kg/m2) 27.51 5.44 
Age (year) 40.82 11.93 
Male 0.56 0.5 
Black 0.11 0.31 
Other race  0.06 0.23 
Hispanic 0.13 0.34 
Married 0.65 0.48 
Income > 185% of Income Poverty Level  0.78 0.41 
Missing income 0.13 0.33 
High school 0.29 0.45 
Some college 0.29 0.45 
College degree and beyond 0.34 0.47 
Number of children age 0-5 years 0.27 0.62 
Number of children age 6-17 years 0.57 0.93 
Northeast 0.18 0.38 
Midwest 0.25 0.43 
West 0.22 0.42 
Metropolitan area 0.83 0.38 
Weekend 0.42 0.49 
Summer 0.24 0.43 
Holiday 0.02 0.13 
White caller occupations  0.50 0.50 
Blue caller occupations  0.25 0.44 
Service occupations 0.25 0.43 
Observations are weighted using the Eating and Health Module sample weights. 





Table 3.2: Summary statistics of lifestyle and secondary eating 
 
  
Variables Mean S.D. (Time allocations are in 10 minutes’ intervals) 
Panel A 
Activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) 62.85 31.37 
Activities with (1.5 < MET < 3) 55.51 25.74 
Socializing 1.15 4.11 
Watching TV 12.62 13.13 
Video/board games 0.74 3.9 
Computer use 0.67 3.21 
Reading 1.4 4.15 
Work 32.73 25.42 
Sedentary commute 7.57 6.85 
Physical activities 1.63 5.03 
Panel B 
Secondary eating  7.92 18.39 
Secondary eating while doing activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) 2.65 8.42 
Secondary eating while doing activities with (1.5 < MET < 3) 5.4 14.64 
Observations are weighted using the Eating and Health Module sample weights.  
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Table 3.3: Secondary eating mean differences between obese and normal weight individuals 
Variables Obese
 
BMI ≥ 30a 
Normal weight 
BMI < 25b Mean difference  
(Time allocations are in 10 minutes’ intervals) Mean Mean 
Secondary eating 8.34 8.32 0.02 
Secondary eating while doing activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) 3.29 2.87 0.42** 
Secondary eating while doing activities with (1.5 < MET < 3) 5.34 5.39 -0.05 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a: N = 5,255 
b: N = 6,772 











BMI ≥ 30a 
Normal weight 
BMI <25b Mean difference  (Time allocations are in 10 minutes’ intervals) Mean Mean 
Activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) 66.92 64.22 2.70*** 
Activities with (1.5 < MET < 3) 51 52.64 -1.64*** 
Socializing 1.30 1.03 0.27*** 
Watching TV 15.02 11.67 3.35*** 
Video/board games 0.90 0.60 0.30*** 
Computer use 0.74 0.69 0.05 
Reading 1.39 1.74 -0.35*** 
Work 26.43 24.74 1.69*** 
Sedentary commute 7.35 7.42 -0.06 
Physical activities 1.22 1.90 -0.68*** 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a: N = 5,255 






















Table 3.5: The effect of secondary eating on BMI 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable is Body Mass Index 
(BMI) 
    
Secondary eating 0.006* 0.006** 0.006* 0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age 0.050*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Male 1.204*** 1.182*** 1.195*** 1.194*** 
 (0.107) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) 
Black 1.871*** 1.634*** 1.592*** 1.591*** 
 (0.168) (0.172) (0.174) (0.174) 
Hispanic 1.052*** 0.664*** 0.763*** 0.764*** 









 (0.230) (0.225) (0.228) (0.228) 
Married  0.123 0.088 0.090 
  (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 






  (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) 
Income missing  -0.258 -0.257 -0.252 
  (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) 
High school  0.436* 0.426* 0.424* 
  (0.230) (0.229) (0.230) 
Some college  0.266 0.289 0.287 
  (0.233) (0.232) (0.233) 






  (0.228) (0.228) (0.229) 
Number of children age 0-5 years  0.149* 0.154* 0.153* 
  (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) 
Number of children age 6-17 years  0.123** 0.128** 0.130** 






Table 3.5: Continued 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable is Body Mass 
Index (BMI) 
    
Northeast   -0.469*** -0.470*** 
   (0.152) (0.152) 
Midwest   -0.092 -0.094 
   (0.137) (0.137) 
West   -0.442*** -0.441*** 
   (0.144) (0.144) 
Metropolitan area   -0.336** -0.336** 
   (0.144) (0.143) 
Weekend    0.016 
    (0.101) 
Summer    0.112 
    (0.120) 
Holiday    0.368 
    (0.487) 
The year of 2007    0.121 
    (0.127) 
The year of 2008    0.056 
    (0.125) 
Constant 24.467*** 24.695*** 25.110*** 25.012*** 
 (0.226) (0.337) (0.353) (0.364) 
Observations 19,328 19,328 19,328 19,328 
R-squared 0.037 0.055 0.057 0.058 





Table 3.6: The effect of secondary eating on BMI: Adjusting for aspects of lifestyle 
 All 
 (1) 
Dependent variable is Body Mass Index (BMI)  




Watching TV 0.034*** 
 (0.005) 
Playing games 0.058*** 
 (0.017) 






Sedentary commute 0.022*** 
 (0.008) 














Income > 185% of Income poverty level -0.394*** 
 (0.145) 







Table 3.6. Continued 
 All 
 (1) 
Dependent variable is Body Mass Index (BMI)  
High school 0.428* 
 (0.229) 
Some college 0.349 
 (0.233) 
College degree and beyond -0.873*** 
 (0.230) 
Number of children age 0-5 years 0.210** 
 (0.087) 
















The year of 2007 0.122 
 (0.126) 













Table 3.7: Joint hypothesis tests 
 Joint hypothesis tests F-value 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Socializing 27.17 




Playing games  
Computer use   
Reading    
Work     
Sedentary 
commute      
Physical 
activities       





Table 3.8: The effect of secondary eating on BMI: Adjusting for aspects of lifestyle 
among different groups 
 
 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable is Body Mass Index (BMI) 
      
Secondary eating 0.001 0.006 0.010** -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Socializing 0.011 0.017 0.015 0.010 0.013 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Watching TV 0.031*** 0.038*** 0.045*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Playing games 0.048** 0.086*** 0.101*** 0.025 0.033 
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.027) 
Computer use 0.030 0.046 0.045 0.064 0.005 
 (0.024) (0.035) (0.029) (0.045) (0.022) 
Reading 0.008 0.020 0.018 0.059 -0.029 
 (0.039) (0.016) (0.015) (0.083) (0.027) 
Work 0.010*** 0.010** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Sedentary commute 0.023** 0.020 0.031*** -0.015 0.042** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015) (0.019) 
Physical activities -0.016 -
0.111*** 
-0.060*** 0.001 -0.034* 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 9,877 9,451 10,442 4,351 4,535 
R-squared 0.042 0.092 0.081 0.041 0.080 





Table 3.9: The effect of secondary eating on BMI: Adjusting for aspects of lifestyle among different groups 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable is Body Mass Index (BMI)       
       
Secondary eating 0.005 0.002 0.008* 0.011*** -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 
Activities with (1.5 ≥ MET) 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.039*** 0.029*** 0.013* 0.025*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
Activities with (1.5 < MET < 3) 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.013** 0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
       
       
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 19,328 9,877 9,451 10,442 4,351 4,535 
R-squared 0.060 0.036 0.086 0.071 0.032 0.075 







Table 3.10: The effect of secondary eating on BMI: Adjusting for primary tasks among different groups 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable is Body Mass Index (BMI)       
       
Secondary eating while doing activities with (1.5 ≥ 
MET) 
0.027*** 0.032** 0.023** 0.034** 0.021 0.021 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) 
Secondary eating while doing activities with (1.5 < 
MET < 3) 
0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.004 -0.009 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) 
       
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 19,328 9,877 9,451 10,442 4,351 4,535 
R-squared 0.060 0.036 0.086 0.071 0.032 0.075 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 









Variations in time preferences help explain variations in health-related behaviors 
such as smoking, caloric intake, physical activities, and obesity. Impatient individuals 
discount the future more, weighing present gratification more than future well-being. The 
opposite is true for patient individuals. The rate of time preference measures the ability to 
delay benefits in this present-future trade-off. Many researchers elicit the rate of time 
preference using questionnaires for monetary gains and losses (Fuchs, 1980; Khwaja, 
Silverman, & Sloan, 2007), asking, for example, to choose between receiving $5 today 
and $10 in a week. Others use proxies for the rate of time preferences  (Lawless, 
Drichoutis, & Nayga Jr, 2013). Huston and Finke (2003) use the level of education, 
exercise, and the use of nutritional labels as proxies for time preferences to investigate 
the effect of time preferences on diet choices. Smith, Bogin, and Bishai (2005) use 
dissaving as a proxy to estimate the effect of time preferences on obesity. Cavaliere, De 
Marchi, and Banterle (2013) use the consideration of taste vs. nutrition when food 
shopping as a proxy when investigating obesity. In their investigation of obesity, Zhang 
and Rashad (2008) use the lack of self-control to lose weight and Ikeda, Kang, and 
Ohtake (2010) use debt and the degree of procrastinating over homework assignments 
during school vacations as proxies for time preferences. 
These proxies reflect intertemporal choices in which individuals make trade-offs 
between the present and the future. For example, the consideration of nutrition involves 




studies find that impatience is associated with a negative health outcome. For instance, 
Ikeda et al. (2010), find that an increase in the degree of procrastinating over homework 
assignments during school vacations is associated with a 2.81% increase in the 
probability of being obese. 
In their investigation of the effect of time preferences on obesity, Borghans and 
Golsteyn (2006) examine the use of their time preference proxies by determining 
correlations between the proxies used and elicited discount rates. They conclude that the 
relationship between obesity and time preferences strongly depends on the choice of 
proxies. The validation of using proxies to explain the effect of time preferences on 
health outcomes has not been exhaustively investigated. The objective of this paper is to 
scrutinize the use and validity of such proxies for time preferences in investigations of 
health outcomes. This paper’s emphasis is on the methodology rather than on policy 
implications. The results will provide researchers interested in determining the effect of 
time preferences on health outcomes with guidance on how to measure time preferences, 
specifically those who use secondary data. 
For health outcomes, we focus on obesity. The prevalence of obesity has rapidly 
increased. Approximately two-thirds of the U.S. adult population are either overweight or 
obese (U.S. Department of Agricultural, 2016b). In an effort to understand the factors 
that contribute to obesity, researchers have shown interest in estimating the effect of time 
preferences on obesity, either by eliciting or using proxies for the rate of time preference.  
We utilize data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), which is a 
nationally representative database from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In 1979, the 




interview them annually until 1994 and biennially afterward. Before 2006, the NLSY79 
provided information that can be used as proxies for time preferences. Our choice of 
proxies comes from the studies of Cadena and Keys (2015); Courtemanche et al. (2015); 
DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) that are most recent and use the NLSY79. The 
investigated proxies are: “The interviewer remarks whether the participant was patient,” 
having a bank account, declaring bankruptcy, maxing out a credit card, smoking, joining 
vocational clubs in high school, life insurance, and the Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT). We term the interviewer remark the “patience” proxy. The AFQT is an IQ test 
that determines military entrance and was given to the NLSY79 participants. In 2006, the 
NLSY79 added two hypothetical monetary present-future trade-off questions to its 
survey. The first question informs the participants about winning $1,000, then asks them 
to state the additional amount they will accept to receive the prize in a month. The second 
question is similar except the time horizon is a year rather than a month. The NLSY79 
also contains information on body weight and height, enabling us to measure obesity. 
Given these two elicitation questions as well as information to measure obesity, we 
compare the elicited rates of time preference to the various proxies to validate the use of 
proxies in the estimation of the effect of time preferences on obesity. 
The standard economic assumption is that people discount the future at a constant 
rate of time preference, which is characterized by an exponential functional form 
(Samuelson, 1937). Recent evidence suggests that the rate of time preference is relatively 
low in the near future and relatively high in the far future, characterized by a quasi-
hyperbolic functional form (Laibson, 1997). Because the elicitation questions cover two-




constant exponential discount rate, in relation to the proxy measures. We use the 
concentration indices (CIs). The CIs rank the population by a measure of time 
preferences and calculate the overall concentration of the cumulative percentage of 
obesity against the cumulative percentage of the population (Wagstaff, O'Donnell, Van 
Doorslaer, & Lindelow, 2007). The CIs are superior to OLS because the CIs consider 
variations in the ranking rather than variations in the time preference measure, so the 
results are insensitive to outliers or different proxy scaling. The individual will have the 
same ranking regardless of outliers and different scaling among our proxies, simplifying 
the validation of our proxies and providing a value judgment to guide practitioners who 
are interested in using proxies to estimate health outcomes. 
The results support the validity of time preference proxies to explain variations in 
time preference. Ranking the population by different time preference measures indicates 
the obesity concentration among impatient individuals. Under hyperbolic discounting, the 
proxies of patience, smoking, life insurance, and joining vocational clubs in high school 
are validated. In contrast, under the exponential discounting, the proxies of patience, 
maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, smoking, life insurance, and joining vocational 
clubs are also validated. Other proxies overestimate patience by 5% under hyperbolic 
discounting and by 4% under exponential discounting. We also test the performance of 
our proxies among demographic subgroups, including males vs. females, highly educated 
vs. less educated, and white vs. nonwhite individuals to further guide practitioners who 
are targeting a specific demographic group.  
The rest of this essay is divided into five sections. Section 4.2 explains the 




discounting. Section 4.3 presents the data used for the analysis, demonstrating the 
computation of the rates of time preferences and providing more details for our proxies. 
Section 4.4 explains the model regarding the use of the CIs to validate time preference 
proxies. Section 4.5 reports the results, and section 4.6 concludes the discussion. 
4.2. Time Preference 
The intertemporal choices reflect a trade-off between present gratifications and 
future well-being. Impulsive behaviors involve a cost of forgoing the present gratification 
now and receiving the benefit later. For example, dieting involves a cost of forgoing the 
present gratification of tasty food to generate better health in the future. The rate of time 
preference measures the ability to delay benefits. In technical terms, let U be the utility. 
For a finite time 𝑇𝑇, the discounted utility model is equal to,  
 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖+2 + ⋯     ; 𝑡𝑡 = 0,1,2, …𝑇𝑇. 
(4.1) 
The standard economic assumption is that the economic agent is rational, 
discounting the future at a constant rate of time preference, and the exponential functional 
form characterizes the rate of time preference (Samuelson, 1937), 










Other studies indicate a conflict between the rate of time preference today and in 
the future (Laibson, 1997; R. Thaler, 1981). An example from (R. Thaler, 1981) explains 
such conflict (time inconsistency). Suppose an individual faces two sets of choices, (A) 
and (B) as follows: 
(A) Choose between: (A.1) One apple today. 
  (A.2) Two apples tomorrow.  
    
(B) Choose between: (B.1) One apple in one year.  
  (B.2) Two apples in one year plus one day.  
Source: (R. Thaler, 1981) 
This individual might choose (A.1) over (A.2) and (B.2) over (B.1). The consistency in 
time preferences implies that in 364 days, the individual still prefers (B.2) over (B.1). 
However, preferences reflect time-inconsistency if reconsidering (B.1). 
Heath behaviors such as smoking, exercising, and dietary choices might reflect 
time-inconsistency in discounting. For example, someone prefers exercising in a week 
over exercising now. A week later, he or she procrastinates maybe to the following week 
and so on, drawn on the present bias. In this situation, the exponential functional form 
fails to explain individuals’ behaviors. Laibson (1997) suggests that quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting resonates with the inconsistency in time preference. Hyperbolic discounting 
means that the individual discounts the near future at a high rate and discounts the far 
future at a low rate. Shapiro (2005) finds that food stamp program (currently called the 




caloric intake in months in which they receive benefits. Food stamp recipients 
impatiently increase their caloric intake at the beginning of the month but patiently 
decrease their caloric intake toward the end of the month. Richards and Hamilton (2012) 
investigate the effect of time preferences on risk behaviors including obesity and find that 
hyperbolic discounting provides a better fit of their data. Following Laibson (1997) the 
discounted utility model is equal to, 
 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿2𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖+2 + ⋯     ; 𝑡𝑡 = 0,1,2, …𝑇𝑇, 
(4.2) 
where 𝛽𝛽 is the present bias, 𝛽𝛽 < 1 implies time-inconsistency, and 𝛽𝛽 = 1 implies time-
consistency in which the discount factor takes the exponential functional form. 
Nevertheless, The NLSY79 provides two elicitation questions over two time frames. The 
first-time frame is over a month and the other is over a year. The empirical model uses 
the hyperbolic discount factor and the constant exponential discount factor in relation to 
the proxy measures. The following section explains the data used for the analysis, 
demonstrating the elicitation procedure and the logic for our proxies. 
4.3. Data 
We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), which is 
a nationally representative database from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In 1979, 
NLSY79 interviewed 12,686 youths between 14-22 years. The same individuals were 
then interviewed annually until 1994 and biennially after 1994. We omit observations 




Before 2006, the NLSY79 provided information that could be used to proxy for 
time preferences. However, in 2006, the NLSY79 added two hypothetical present-future 
trade-off questions to its survey. In the first question, the time horizon is a month. In the 
second question, the time horizon is a year. The hypothetical monetary questions asked in 
the NLSY79 are:  
“Suppose you have won a prize of $1000, which you can 
claim immediately. However, you can choose to wait one 
month to claim the prize. If you do wait, you will receive 
more than $1000. What is the smallest amount of money in 
addition to the $1000 you would have to receive one month 
from now to convince you to wait rather than claim the prize 
now?” 
“Let me ask the same question but with a one year wait 
instead of one month. Suppose you have won a prize of 
$1000, which you can claim immediately. However, you 
have the alternative of waiting one year to claim the prize. If 
you do wait, you will receive more than $1000. What is the 
smallest amount of money in addition to the $1000 you 
would have to receive one year from now to convince you to 
wait rather than claim the prize now?” 
4.3.1. The Calculation of Discount Factors 
We exploit the different time frames of the elicitation questions to compute the 
constant exponential discount factor and the hyperbolic discount factor (Courtemanche et 
al., 2015). Let 𝑎𝑎1 denote the answer to the first hypothetical monetary question over a 
month time horizon. The annualized discount factor, 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹1, is 










Let also 𝑎𝑎2 denote the answer to the second hypothetical monetary question over 
a year time horizon. The annualized discount factor, 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹2, is 





𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹1 is equal to the hyperbolic discount factor, 𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿 in equation 4.2, and 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹2 is equal to the 
exponential discount factor, 𝛿𝛿 in equation 4.1.  
4.3.2. Time Preference Proxies 
Our choice of proxies comes from Cadena and Keys (2015); Courtemanche et al. 
(2015); DellaVigna and Paserman (2005). These studies are most recent and use time 
preference proxies from the NLSY79.15 Cadena and Keys (2015) estimate the effect of 
time preference on investments in human capital. Impatient individuals invest less in 
human capital and earn 13% less over their lifetimes compared to patient individuals 
(Cadena & Keys, 2015). Cadena and Keys (2015) also find that impatient individuals are 
less likely to save money and more likely to smoke, excessively drink, attrit the NLSY79 
that they had previously agreed to participate in, and exit the military early. DellaVigna 
and Paserman (2005) use proxies to estimate the effect of time preference on job search 
by the unemployed. Impatient individuals make fewer efforts searching for a job, exiting 
unemployment later. Courtemanche et al. (2015) study the interactions of time 
preferences and food prices and their effects on obesity. Impatient individuals are more 
                                                 
15 Courtemanche et al. (2015) and Cadena and Keys (2015) provide online supporting material. We use 




responsive to low food prices, which leads to the overconsumption of food and obesity. 
Courtemanche et al. (2015) find that the elicited discount factors are correlated with other 
proxies that reflect intertemporal choices. For example, the elicited discount factors are 
positively correlated with the AFQT and negatively correlated with maxing out a credit 
card, smoking, and declaring bankruptcy (Courtemanche et al., 2015). Our analysis uses 
the following proxies: 
Patience: After each survey, the interviewer remarks on the general attitude of the 
survey participant: whether the participant was friendly and interested, cooperative but 
not particularly interested, impatient and restless, or hostile. We use the interviewer 
remarks to generate a proxy for time preference that we term “patience.” The patience 
proxy is equal to 1 if the individual is friendly and interested, and zero if otherwise. The 
patience proxy also was implemented by DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) and Cadena 
and Keys (2015). However, our interpretation of patience/impatience differs from that in 
DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) and Cadena and Keys (2015). We consider 
“cooperative but not interested” as impatient, whereas DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) 
and Cadena and Keys (2015) consider them otherwise. The reason is that DellaVigna and 
Paserman (2005) and Cadena and Keys (2015) were interested in measuring 
patience/impatience using the interviewer remarks in the period of 1980-1985. At that 
time, the participants were much younger (15-28 years). However, we are interested in 
using the interviewer remarks in 2006 when participants are much older (41-49 years 
old). Younger individuals are more inclined to express their impatience directly, but 




consider as impatient those whom interviewers identify as cooperative but not 
particularly interested. 
Bank account: A bank account organizes spending in the present and saves money 
for the future. Patient consumers are more likely to possess a bank account. We use the 
1985-2000 and 2004 waves to obtain information on having a bank account. For each 
year, we create a dummy variable indicating the possession of a bank account and assign 
participants the average dummies. 
Maxing out a credit card: Impatient consumers are more likely to max out a credit 
card, although doing so raises the interest paid. We use the NLSY79 2004 wave, which 
asks consumers the total number of maxed out credit cards. This proxy is a dummy 
variable, which equals 1 if the person had never maxed out a credit card, and zero 
otherwise. 
Bankruptcy: Patience lends itself to better financial management either through 
controlling impulsive spending, saving, or maintaining the earning source. In contrast, 
impatience lends itself to worse financial management, increasing the odds of 
bankruptcy. The NLSY79 asks participants whether they ever have declared bankruptcy. 
A dummy variable is added, which equals 1 if the individual had never declared 
bankruptcy, and zero otherwise. 
Life insurance: Patient individuals are more likely to work for employers who 
provide life insurance. We use information from the NLSY79 1979-2004 waves. For each 
year, we create a dummy variable that indicates obtaining employer-provided life 




Vocational clubs in high school: Patient students are more likely to obtain higher 
education and less likely to participate in a vocational club in high school. In 1984, the 
NLSY79 asked participants if they engaged in vocational clubs in high school. Similar to 
DellaVigna and Paserman (2005), we focus on seven vocational clubs. We create a 
dummy variable for not participating in each club and then assign each individual the 
average dummies. The vocational clubs are: The American Industrial Arts Association, 
Distributive Education Clubs of America, Future Business Leaders of America, Future 
Farmers of America, Health Occupations Student Association, Office Education 
Association which is now known as the Business Professionals of America, and 
Vocations Industrial Club of America (DellaVigna & Paserman, 2005). 
Smoking: Given the negative health consequences smoking can cause, patience 
leads to forgoing the present gratification of cigarettes for future wellbeing. In 1992, 
1994, and 1998, the NLSY79 asked participants whether they have smoked at least 100 
cigarettes during their lives. We add a dummy variable that indicates if the participant has 
not smoked 100 cigarettes. 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT): The AFQT is an IQ test that 
determines military entrance. In 1981, the NLSY79 participants took the AFQT test, 
regardless of their interest in serving in the military. Those participants who are future-
oriented invest in human capital and score higher on the AFQT. 
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics for time preference measures. The 
average hyperbolic and exponential discount factor equals 0.28 and 0.59, respectively. 




the exponential discount factor indicates a higher level. One explanation for the 
difference between the discount factors is that the present bias, 𝛽𝛽, is high among 
hyperbolic discounters. On average, the NLSY79 interviewers remark on 87% of 
participants as patient. Seventy-five percent of the time, individuals report that they 
possess a bank account. Ninety-one percent never max out a credit card and 87% have 
never declared bankruptcy. Roughly 60% of individuals indicate having life insurance 
that was provided by their employers. Forty-three percent of individuals have not smoked 
100 cigarettes in their lives, and 97% never participated in vocational clubs in high 
school. The average AFQT score equals 51%. Table 4.2 shows the pairwise correlations 
between time preference measures. The correlation between the exponential discount 
factor and the hyperbolic discount factor is 0.58. Both discount factors are positively 
correlated with other proxies, yet they are attenuated, maybe because these proxies are 
calculated from different waves of the NLSY79 (DellaVigna & Paserman, 2005). 
We focus on obesity as the health outcome variable. Obesity is measured by the 
Body Mass Index (BMI), which is defined as weight in kilograms divided by the square 
of height in meters (kg/m2). The obesity threshold is set to 30 (kg/m2). Expressing the 
BMI distribution as a dichotomous variable neglects body weight beyond the obesity 
threshold (Bilger, Kruger, & Finkelstein, 2016), and so we consider body weight beyond 
the obesity threshold. Let ℎ be the obesity outcome variable, 
 ℎ = �(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 − 𝑠𝑠)   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ≥ 𝑠𝑠






where 𝑠𝑠 is the obesity threshold (hereafter, health outcomes are reverse to obesity and 
vice versa). 
The above proxies present patience. The patience level increases in a non-
descending order. For example, the bank account proxy consists of fractional values 
bounded between zero and one. A zero value means perfect impatience, and one means 
perfect patience. We estimate the predicted values of all proxies as well as the elicited 
discount factors controlling for age, gender, education, race, occupation, net family 
income, and risk. For the patience proxy, we also control for the interview length. For 
occupation, we categorize participants into white collar, blue collar, or service 
occupations (Courtemanche et al., 2015). For risk, we incorporate the certainty equivalent 
of a 50/50 chance gamble of winning $10,000 or nothing. Table 4.3 presents a summary 
of statistics for the individuals’ characteristics. The average BMI equals 28, which 
indicates the high prevalence of obesity. The proportion of individuals who fall beyond 
the obesity threshold is equal to 29%. The average BMI beyond the obesity threshold 
equals 1.41 (kg/m2). During the investigation, participants were middle aged, between 41 
and 49 years old, with an average of 45 years old. The sample consists of 53% male, 6% 
Hispanic, 13% black, 81% white, and 64% married individuals. 
Regarding education attainment, the share of high school graduates is 41%, and 
the share of individuals with some college is 24%. Twenty-eight percent have a college 
degree or beyond. On average, individuals work 36 hours per week. Fifty-five percent 
work in white-collar occupations, 23% work in blue-collar occupations, and 10% work in 




$10,000). On risk attitude, the certainty equivalent of a 50/50 chance gamble of winning 
$10,000 or nothing roughly averages $4,800. 
Finally, the elicited discount factors as well as the proxies of bank account, 
vocational clubs, and life insurance proxies, contain fractional values bounded between 
zero and one. For a fractional dependent variable with extreme values at zero and one, 
Papke and Wooldridge (1996) suggest the use of a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) 
with a binomial family and a probit link to provide a better inference. We also estimate 
the probability of the patience, bankruptcy, smoking, and maxing out credit card proxies 
using probit models. The predicted values of the AFQT proxy are estimated using OLS. 
4.4. Model 
To validate the use of time preference proxies in estimating health outcomes, we 
employ the Concentration Indices (CIs). The CIs are widely used in poverty analysis to 
measure socioeconomic-health inequality. For example, Makate and Makate (2016) use 
the CIs to measure socioeconomic inequality in the utilization of maternal healthcare for 
the Zimbabwean population. Arnold et al. (2016) use the CIs to calculate socioeconomic 
inequalities in cancer incidence and mortality among 43 countries. Others such as 
Yiengprugsawan, Lim, Carmichael, Dear, and Sleigh (2010) estimate socioeconomic 
inequality in morbidity in Thailand, Wagstaff, Van Doorslaer, and Watanabe (2003) 
measure socioeconomic inequality in malnutrition in Vietnam in 1993 and 1998, Bilger et 
al. (2016) estimate the socioeconomic inequality in obesity for the U.S. population from 
1971-2012, and Lindelow (2006) measures socioeconomic inequality in hospital visits, 
health center visits, complete immunizations, pregnancy control, and institutional 




The CIs investigate the overall concentration of the cumulative percentage of the 
health outcome against the cumulative percentage of the population, ranked by a 
specified standard. Studies that focus on socioeconomic inequality in health rank the 
population by living standards. For example, they rank the population by poverty income 
ratio (Bilger et al., 2016), an asset index (Makate & Makate, 2016), monthly adult-
equivalent household income (Yiengprugsawan et al., 2010), and an index of human 
development (Arnold et al., 2016). Because our interest is validating time preference 
proxies, we rank the population by a measure of time preference instead of a living 
standard. We rank the population by the hyperbolic discount factor, the exponential 
discount factor, and the other proxies. A statistically insignificant difference between the 
CIs based on the elicited discount factors and those based on a certain proxy validates the 
use of that proxy. 
Another method to validate the use of time preference proxies is to use OLS, by 
separately regressing the health outcome variable on the elicited discount factors and 
other proxies with controlling for other observed factors. Across equations, we test the 
differences between the elicited discount factor coefficients and the coefficients of other 
proxies. Suppose that all time preference measures’ coefficients have the expected 
patterns. Impatience is positively associated with poor health outcomes. A statistically 
insignificant difference between the elicited discount factor coefficient and a certain 
proxy coefficient validates the use of the proxy. 
However, the CIs method is superior to OLS for two reasons. First, outliers affect 
the OLS estimates. For example, consider two cases. In the first case, someone has life 




person has life insurance for 6 years, and again this is the highest value. In both cases, the 
OLS might yield different results. Second, different proxy scaling prevents us from 
obtaining a value judgment. We assume that the elicited discount factors are the correct 
time preference measures. If bias between the elicited discount factor and time preference 
proxies exists, we are only able to determine its direction, but not the magnitude. As an 
illustration, suppose we run an OLS, and ?̂?𝛽1 is the elicited discount factor coefficient. 
Also, suppose we run another OLS regression of the health outcome on the life insurance 
proxy, and ?̂?𝛽2 is the proxy coefficient. Recall that for the life insurance proxy, we create 
20 dummy variables. If bias exists, then the bias equals  ?̂?𝛽1 − ?̂?𝛽2 when assigning each 
individual the average dummies and equals ?̂?𝛽1 −
𝛽𝛽�2
20
  when assigning each individual the 
summation of 20 dummies. Thus, different proxy scaling affects bias magnitude, ?̂?𝛽1 −




Our contribution is methodological; we aim at providing practitioners who are 
interested in using time preference proxies to estimate health outcomes the guidance to 
do so. The CIs provide a value judgment, so we determine which proxy better explains 
variations in time preferences and provide practitioners with suggestions on how to adjust 
for bias when using imperfect proxies. Outliers and different scaling do not affect the CIs.  
The CIs consider the variations in ranking, not the variations in time preference measures 
(Wagstaff et al., 2007). It does not matter how we scale our proxies and whether outliers 
exist in the data; an individual has the same ranking. 
 The CI is defined as one minus twice the area under the concentration curve (CC) 




cumulative percentage of the health outcome against the cumulative percentage of the 
population, ranked by a measure of a time preference as appearing in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. 
The 45-degree line is called the equality line, which indicates the situation when the 
health outcome is equal for all individuals regardless of their level of patience. If the CC 
appears above the equality line, the health outcomes are concentrated among the 
impatient as shown in Figure 4.1. In contrast, if the CC is below the equality line, the 
health outcomes are concentrated among the patient as shown in Figure 4.2. The CI 
measures concentration in health outcomes as, 





where 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 denotes the concentration index, 𝑝𝑝 is the fractional rank of the population below 
a specified threshold, and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the concentration curve. 
For computational ease, the concentration index is equal to the covariance 
between the health outcome and the fractional rank, scaled by two and divided by the 






where 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐(ℎ, 𝑒𝑒) denotes the covariance between the health variable, ℎ, and the rank of 




4.7 after rescaling the health outcome variable by twice the rank variance divided by the 
mean of the health outcome (Erreygers, Clarke, & Zheng, 2017; Lindelow, 2006; 




ℎ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒 + 𝜖𝜖, 
(4.8) 
The CI is equal to ?̂?𝛽 in equation 4.8. For statistical inference, we use the standard error of 
?̂?𝛽. The CI is equal to −1 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 ≤ 1. A negative value admits the concentration of health 
outcome among impatient individuals, but a positive value admits the concentration of 
health outcomes among patient individuals. A zero CI means no variation in the health 
outcome. 
The CIs can be sensitive to the choice of the ranking measure (Lindelow, 2006; 
Wagstaff et al., 2007; Wagstaff et al., 2003). Wagstaff and Watanabe (2003) study the 
CI’s sensitivity to the choice of a living standard. Across 19 countries, they measure two 
outcomes of child malnutrition, being underweight or stunted, ranking the population by 
consumption and an asset index. For each child malnutrition outcome, at most 6 out of 19 
countries show sensitivities to the choice of the living standard, concluding that both 
living standards generate the same CIs.  Lindelow (2006) also uses both consumption and 
the asset index to measure socioeconomic inequality in four health outcomes. For all four 
health outcomes, the CIs show sensitivity to the living standard choice, contrasting with 




The CIs sensitivity to the choice of a ranking measure concerns practitioners 
whose focus is measuring socioeconomics inequality in health. However, we consider the 
CIs sensitivity to be a real strength in validating the use of time preference proxies in the 
estimation of health outcomes. Our main assumption is that the elicited discount factors 
are the correct time preference measures, and so we ask the following question- does a 
ranking by time preference proxy alter the CIs? To explain the situations when time 
preference proxy yields the same result as the elicited discount factor, suppose 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 and 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 
are the rankings based on the elicited discount factor and time preference proxy, 
respectively. Also suppose 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒 and 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝 are the two 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵s based on different rankings, then 






where Δ𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 is the difference between the two CIs,Δ𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 = 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒 − 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝 and Δ𝑒𝑒 is the 
difference between the rankings, Δ𝑒𝑒 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 − 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝. For individuals to have the same ranking 
on both time preference measures, Δ𝑒𝑒=0, is a sufficient condition. The necessary 
condition is that the reranking does not covary with the health outcome even if they have 









where 𝜎𝜎Δ𝑟𝑟2  is the reranking variance. ?̂?𝛽1 in equation 4.10 is equal to Δ𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵. For a statistical 
inference, we also use the standard error of ?̂?𝛽1. Finally, we use equation 4.8 to estimate 
the CIs, ranking the population by the elicited hyperbolic discount factor, the elicited 
exponential discount factor, and other proxies. Assuming that the elicited discount factors 
are the correct time preference measures, we use equation 4.10 to determine how 
reranking from the elicited discount factors to time preference proxies affect the CIs. 
4.5. Results 
Table 4.4 shows the results of validating time preference proxies in the estimation 
of health outcomes. Column 1 presents the estimates for obesity concentration using 
equation 4.8. The negative CIs indicate the predicted patterns in which obesity 
concentrates among impatient individuals. The CIs range from 0.105-0.178 in absolute 
value, wherein ranking by the patience proxy demonstrates the smallest pro-impatience 
obesity concentration and ranking by the bank account proxy demonstrates the largest 
pro-impatience obesity concentration. Given the high prevalence of obesity in which 
nearly one-third of the population are obese, a CI between 0.105-0.178 is relatively high. 
Figure 4.3  plots the CCs based on ranking the population by the elicited discount 
factors. The dashed line indicates ranking by the hyperbolic discount factor, and the 
dotted line indicates ranking by the exponential discount factor. The solid line represents 
the equality line, which indicates the situation when all people have the same body 
weight. Both CCs appear above the equality line and demonstrate the obesity 
concentration among impatient individuals. An example of the CCs when ranking the 
population by the time preference proxies appears in Figure 4.4. The dashed line 




ranking by the bank account proxy appears as a dotted line. Ranking by these two proxies 
demonstrates that obesity concentrates among impatient individuals. The CC of the bank 
account proxy lies above the CC of the patience proxy, which determines a higher 
concentration of obesity among impatient individuals. 
To validate time preference proxies, we use equation 4.10 to test whether 
reranking from the elicited discount factors to the other proxies affects the CIs. Column 2 
of Table 4.4 presents the differences in the CIs, Δ𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵, when reranking from the hyperbolic 
discount factor to other proxies. Reranking to the proxies of patience, smoking, life 
insurance, or joining vocational clubs does not affect the CIs. In contrast, reranking from 
the exponential discount factor to the proxies of patience, maxing out a credit card, 
bankruptcy, smoking, joining vocational clubs, or life insurance does not affect the CIs 
appearing in column 3. The similarity between the CIs when reranking from the elicited 
discount factors to the other proxies validates the use of time preference proxies. Such 
similarities do not ensure the same ranking on different time preference measures but 
only suggest that reranking and obesity do not correlate. We strongly suggest employing 
the proxies of patience, maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, life insurance, and 
vocational clubs when assuming exponential time preferences. When assuming 
hyperbolic time preferences, we strongly suggest employing the proxies of patience, 
smoking, life insurance, and vocational clubs. 
Figure 4.5 presents an example of the difference between two CCs when 
reranking the population from the hyperbolic discount factor to the patience proxy. The 
solid line presents the equality line, the dashed-and-dotted line presents the CC when 




ranking by the patience proxy. By visual inspection, these two CCs are quite similar. The 
dotted line presents the CC based on reranking to the patience proxy. Since the two CCs 
from the hyperbolic discount factor and the patience proxy are quite similar, the 
reranking CC lies on the equality line for the most part. Figure 4.6 presents an example of 
the difference between two CCs when reranking the population from the hyperbolic 
discount factor to the bank account proxy. The dashed-and-dotted line indicates the CC 
based on the hyperbolic discount factor and the dashed line presents the CC based on the 
rank of the bank account proxy. The former CC slightly lies below the latter. The dotted 
line demonstrates the difference in both CCs, which slightly lies above the equality line 
for some parts. 
Other proxies that exert statistically significant differences between the CIs 
overestimate patience. Under hyperbolic time preferences, the proxies of bank account, 
maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, and the AFQT overestimate patience by 6, 5, 4.4, 
and 5.5%, respectively. Under exponential time preferences, the bank account proxy 
overestimates patience by 4.1% and the AFQT proxy overestimates patience by 3.6%. 
When practitioners are interested in using other proxies, we suggest that they should 
adjust their estimates by 5% (the average bias) against patience under hyperbolic 
discounting, and by 4% (the average bias) under exponential discounting. 
The performance of time preference proxies among males and females is reported 
in Table 4.5. The first three columns present the results for males. Column 1 indicates 
that obesity concentrates among impatient men. Column 2 shows the validity of our 
proxy when reranking from the hyperbolic discount factor. Except for the life insurance 




as shown in column 3. Columns 4-6 in Table 4.5 present the validity of time preference 
proxies to explain variations in time preferences among females. As expected, obesity 
concentrates among impatient women as shown in column 4. Reranking from the 
hyperbolic discount factor to the proxies of patience, smoking, life insurance, or 
vocational clubs has no significant effect on the differences between the CIs as reported 
in column 5. Column 6 also shows that reranking from the exponential discount factor to 
the proxies of patience, maxing out a credit card, smoking, life insurance, or vocational 
clubs does not affect the differences between the CIs. 
Proxies that exert significant differences in the CIs when reranking from the 
elicited discount factors underestimate patience for men but overestimate patience for 
women. Among men, reranking from the exponential discount factor to the life insurance 
proxy underestimates patience by at least 6%. For women, reranking from the hyperbolic 
discount factor to the proxies of bank account, maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, and 
the AFQT overestimates patience by 12.1, 5.6, 7.6, and 7.7%, respectively. Under the 
exponential discounting, reranking to the proxies of bank account, bankruptcy, and the 
AFQT overestimates patience by 10.5, 5.9, and 6.1%, respectively. 
We suggest that practitioners who focus on men should use the proxies of 
patience, bank account, maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, smoking, life insurance, the 
AFQT, and vocational clubs. Other proxies can be used without adjustment needed under 
hyperbolic discounting, but under exponential discounting, we suggest adjusting 
estimates by 6% against impatience. If the focus is on women, we suggest using the 
proxies of patience, smoking, life insurance, and vocational clubs, under hyperbolic 




maxing out a credit card, smoking, life insurance, and vocational clubs. If practitioners 
want to employ other proxies, we recommend that they should adjust their estimates by 
8% against patience under exponential and hyperbolic discounting. 
Table 4.6 presents the performance of time preference proxies among the highly 
educated and less educated groups. We identify highly educated as those with a college 
degree and beyond and the less educated as those with a high school degree or less. 
Column 1 presents the CIs for the less educated group. Ranking by the elicited discount 
factors does not explain obesity concentration. However, ranking by the proxies of bank 
account, maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, and the AFQT explain obesity 
concentration among the impatient. Columns 2 and 3 validate all proxies under 
hyperbolic and exponential discounting. Column 4 reports the CIs for the highly educated 
group. Except for the patience proxy, other time preference measures indicate the obesity 
concentration. Column 5 demonstrates that reranking from the hyperbolic discount factor 
to the proxies of bank account, maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, life insurance, or 
the AFQT does not affect the CIs’ differences. Also, reranking from the exponential 
discount factor to the proxies of bank account, maxing out a credit card, life insurance, or 
the AFQT does not change the CIs as shown in column 6. 
If practitioners target the less educated individuals, all proxies are valid. If 
targeting the highly educated individuals, we suggest using the proxies of bank account, 
maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, life insurance, or the AFQT for hyperbolic 
discounting. For exponential discounting, we suggest using the proxies of bank account, 
maxing out a credit card, life insurance, or the AFQT. Other proxies can be used to 




bias based on the differences between the CIs. Nonetheless, for the highly educated 
group, proxies that exert significant differences when reranking from the elicited discount 
factors to other proxies underestimate patience by 10%, on average. Accordingly, we 
suggest adjusting bias against impatience.  
We test the performance of time preference proxies among the white and 
nonwhite groups as reported in Table 4.7. Column 1 shows the CIs for the nonwhite 
group. Except for the patience and smoking proxies, other time preference measures have 
the expected patterns. Obesity is common for the nonwhite impatient individuals. 
Column 2 shows that reranking from the hyperbolic discount factor to the proxies of bank 
account, maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, smoking, life insurance, vocational clubs, 
or the AFQT exerts no statistically significant differences between the CIs. Reranking 
from the exponential discounting to the proxies of bankruptcy or vocational clubs also 
does not change the CIs as shown in column 3. The CIs for the white race are reported in 
column 4. The negative and statistically significant CIs state the concentration of obesity 
among the impatient. Reranking from the hyperbolic discount factor validates the 
patience and life insurance proxies as shown in column 5. Column 6 demonstrates that 
reranking from the exponential discount factor validates the proxies of patience, maxing 
out a credit card, life insurance, and vocational clubs. 
We suggest that practitioners who target nonwhite individuals should use the 
proxies of bank account, maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, smoking, life insurance, 
vocational clubs, or the AFQT, under hyperbolic discounting. When assuming 
exponential time preferences, we suggest using the bankruptcy or the vocational clubs 




hyperbolic time preferences and using proxies of patience, maxing out a credit card, life 
insurance, or vocational clubs under exponential time preferences. Other proxies generate 
bias, underestimating patience for the nonwhite race, by an average of 8 and 5% under 
hyperbolic and exponential discounting, respectively. Among the white race, other 
proxies also generate bias, overestimating patience by 8 and 6% under hyperbolic and 
exponential discounting, respectively. Accordingly, we suggest fixing bias when using 
other proxies. 
Table 4.8 provides a summary of the validated time preference proxies. However, 
the above discussion raises the question, why do these proxies explain variations in time 
preferences? One possible explanation is that current situations either in the financial 
domain or the health domain lead to the uncertainty about the future, reducing the cost of 
forgoing future benefits. Over the health domain, being obese, for example, reduces life 
expectancy and so reduces the cost of forgoing future benefits. As a consequence, obese 
individuals engage in other impulsive behaviors. We test this theory by changing the 
obesity threshold from 30 (kg/ m2) to 25, 35, and 40 (kg/ m2) and investigate the 
performance of our time preferences measures as shown in Tables 4.9-11. The premise 
for testing this theory is that the magnitudes of the CIs and the number of valid proxies 
increase as the obesity threshold increases. Table 4.12 shows the differences between the 
magnitude of the CIs and the number of valid proxies for different obesity thresholds. 
The incremental increases in the CIs and the number of valid proxies as we increase the 
obesity threshold support our theory that being obese reduces the cost of forgoing future 




Over the financial domain, low income is also supposed to reduce the cost of 
forgoing future benefits. J. K. Binkley and Golub (2011) investigate the choices between 
healthy and unhealthy types of breakfast cereal, milk, bread, and soft drinks. To control 
for the possibility that low-income households cannot afford the healthy options, the 
prices within these products are almost identical. The results show that low-income 
households choose unhealthy options even if there is no cost incurred to choose the 
healthy ones (J. K. Binkley & Golub, 2011). This also explains why smoking is common 
among low-income individuals. Despite a cost incurred to buy cigarettes, low-income 
individuals think there is nothing to lose in the future in general (J. Binkley, 2010). 
Finally, we test whether individuals discount future health outcomes 
hyperbolically or exponentially. Table 4.13 shows the reranking from the hyperbolic 
discount factor to the exponential discount factor for different obesity thresholds. At 25 
(kg/ m2) obesity threshold, reranking from the hyperbolic discount factor to the 
exponential discount factor does not affect the difference between the CIs. At 30, 35, and 
40 (kg m2) obesity thresholds, individuals with hyperbolic time preferences deviate 
toward patience by 2, 4, and 6%, respectively. In other words, the present bias, 𝛽𝛽, 
decreases. The positive and significant difference support hyperbolic discounting, 
although the increase is minimal. Table 4.14 shows the differences between the 
hyperbolic and exponential discount factors for males vs. females, highly educated vs. 
less educated, and nonwhite vs. white. Reranking from the hyperbolic discount factor to 
the exponential discount factor suggest that males do not deviate, but females deviate 
toward patience by 2%. Regarding education entitlement, neither group deviates. The 





Risky health behaviors reflect trade-offs between present gratification and future 
benefits. For example, dieting involves a cost of forgoing tasty food to improve future 
health. The rate of time preference measures the ability of individuals to delay benefits. 
Patient individuals delay benefits, whereas impatient individuals do not. Studies that 
investigate the effect of time preferences on health outcomes either elicit or use proxies 
for the rate of time preference. The objective of this paper is to validate the use of time 
preference proxies. For health outcomes, we focus our analysis on obesity. We use data 
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), which contains information 
that we use as proxies and two hypothetical monetary elicitation questions. The first 
question is for a month time horizon, and the second question is for a year time horizon. 
Exploiting these two time horizons for the elicitation questions, we investigate hyperbolic 
discounting in addition to the constant exponential discounting. The results validate the 
use of time preference proxies. Under hyperbolic discounting, we validate the proxies of 
patience, smoking, life insurance, and joining vocational clubs in high school. In contrast, 
under the exponential discounting, patience, maxing out a credit card, bankruptcy, 
smoking, life insurance, and joining vocational clubs are also validated as proxies. Other 
proxies overestimate patience by 5% under hyperbolic discounting and by 4% under 
exponential discounting. 
Our proxies are calculated from different years on the NLSY79 and are validated 
to explain the effect of time preferences on current obesity status. This suggests that time 
preferences might be stable over time (Meier & Sprenger, 2015). Evidence shows that 




frustration management skills later in life (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). The 
validity of our proxies also indicates that impulsive health-related behaviors might be 
substitutes, so past smoking explains current obesity, and vice versa (Cawley, 2015). The 
stability of time preference over time and the substitutability between health-related risk 
behaviors suggest a policy that oriented people delay benefits, so they can invest more in 
health rather than quit one risky health behavior such as smoking just to cope with 
another such as obesity (Cawley, 2015). 
An ongoing discussion is whether individuals discount the future exponentially or 
hyperbolically. The results show that individuals deviate toward patience by 2%, 
supporting hyperbolic discounting. A two percent deviation is very low, given that the 
sample consists of individuals in their mid-ages (41-49 years old). There are two types of 
hyperbolic discounters. The first is a naïve agent who is not aware of the conflict between 
the rate of time preferences in the near and far future, acting in a way similar to the 
exponential discounter. The second is a sophisticated agent who is fully aware of the 
inconsistency in time preferences and who uses commitment devices such as not bringing 
soda home or shopping more frequently and buying a small amount of food each time 
(Scharff, 2009). Our analysis cannot determine whether individuals are naïve and need to 
be educated or sophisticated and need to have better commitment devices. However, this 
small deviation warrants future research. A limitation of this paper is the focus of obesity 
as the health outcome with the uncertainty that the applicability of the results extends to 
other health outcomes. Another limitation is assuming that the elicited discount factors 
are the correct measures of time preference. These elicited discount factors might be 




time preference proxies to explain other health outcomes, as well as validating proxies in 






Table 4.1: Summary statistics for time preference measures  
Variable Mean S.D. 
Hyperbolic discount factor (DF1)a 0.28 0.34 
Exponential discount factor (DF2)a 0.59 0.25 
Patienceb 0.87 0.34 
Bank accountc 0.75 0.30 
Max credit cardd 0.91 0.28 
Bankruptcye 0.87 0.34 
Smokingf 0.43 0.50 
Life insuranceg 0.59 0.30 
Vocational clubsa 0.97 0.07 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)h 51.24 28.91 
Observations are weighted using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth sample 
weights. 
a: N = 6,094 
b: N = 5,879 
c: N = 6,091 
d: N = 5,763 
e: N = 5,818 
f: N = 6,059 
g: N = 6,033 





Table 4.2: Correlations between time preference measures 
Variables DF1 DF2 
Hyperbolic discount factors (DF1) --- --- 
Exponential discount factors (DF2) 0.58*** --- 
Patience 0.01 0.01 
Bank account 0.10*** 0.11*** 
Max credit card 0.06*** 0.05*** 
Bankruptcy 0.00 0.02* 
Smoking 0.01 0.03** 
Life insurance  0.05*** 0.04*** 
Vocational clubs 0.03** 0.03** 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) 0.11*** 0.13*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, observations are weighted using the National 





Table 4.3: Summary statistics of individuals’ characteristics 
Variables Mean S.D. 
Body Mass Index (BMI) 28.04 5.58 
Obesity prevalence 0.29 0.46 
BMI beyond 30 (kg/m2)  1.41 3.36 
Age (years) 44.86 2.30 
Male 0.53 0.50 
Hispanic 0.06 0.24 
Black 0.13 0.34 
White 0.81 0.40 
High school degree 0.41 0.49 
Some college 0.24 0.42 
College graduate and above 0.28 0.45 
Married 0.64 0.48 
Average working hours per week 35.81 19.56 
Net household income ($10,000) 8.29 8.40 
White collar occupation 0.55 0.50 
Blue collar occupation 0.23 0.42 
Service occupation 0.10 0.30 
Certainty equivalent 4796.28 3258.23 
Observations are weighted using the National Longitudinal Survey for Youth sample 
































































Table 4.4: Validating time preference proxies 
Time preference measures  Obesity  
Reranking 
from DF1 to 
other proxies 
Reranking 
from DF2 to 
other proxies 
CI ΔCI ΔCI 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Hyperbolic discount factor (DF1) -0.118*** --- --- (0.018) 
Exponential discount factor 
(DF2) 
-0.138*** --- --- (0.017) 
Patience -0.105*** -0.013 -0.032 (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) 
Bank account  -0.178*** 0.060*** 0.041** (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) 
Max credit card  -0.168*** 0.050** 0.031 (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) 
Bankruptcy -0.162*** 0.044* 0.025 (0.019) (0.024) (0.020) 
Smoking -0.107*** -0.012 -0.031 (0.020) (0.025) (0.021) 
Life insurance -0.106*** -0.012 -0.031 (0.020) (0.026) (0.022) 
Vocational clubs -0.114*** -0.005 -0.024 (0.019) (0.030) (0.030) 
Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT) 
-0.174*** 0.055*** 0.036** 
(0.018) (0.021) (0.017) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Figure 4.3: The concentration curves based on ranking the population by the hyperbolic 
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Figure 4.4: The concentration curves based on ranking the population by the patience and 
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Figure 4.5: The difference in the concentration curves based on reranking the population 
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Figure 4.6: The difference in the concentration curves based on reranking the population 
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Table 4.5: Validating time preference proxies among males and females 




from DF1 to 
other proxies 
Reranking 




from DF1 to 
other proxies 
Reranking 
from DF2 to 
other proxies 
CI ΔCI ΔCI CI ΔCI ΔCI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Hyperbolic discount factor 
(DF1) 
-0.112*** --- --- -0.117*** --- --- (0.024) (0.025) 
Exponential discount factor 
(DF2) 
-0.115*** --- --- -0.133*** --- --- (0.022) (0.023) 
Patience -0.114*** 0.002 -0.000 -0.158*** 0.041 0.025 (0.022) (0.027) (0.023) (0.024) (0.030) (0.026) 
Bank account  -0.114*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.238*** 0.121*** 0.105*** (0.025) (0.031) (0.024) (0.025) (0.031) (0.027) 
Max credit card  -0.114*** 0.003 -0.000 -0.173*** 0.056** 0.040 (0.023) (0.030) (0.028) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) 
Bankruptcy -0.108*** -0.004 -0.007 -0.192*** 0.076** 0.059** (0.026) (0.036) (0.029) (0.026) (0.032) (0.027) 
Smoking -0.109*** -0.002 -0.005 -0.106*** -0.011 -0.027 (0.028) (0.033) (0.027) (0.028) (0.036) (0.031) 
Life insurance -0.058** -0.053 -0.056** -0.131*** 0.014 -0.002 (0.028) (0.034) (0.028) (0.026) (0.036) (0.032) 
Vocational clubs -0.128*** 0.016 0.013 -0.096*** -0.021 -0.037 (0.028) (0.033) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025) 
Armed Forces Qualification 
Test (AFQT) 
-0.144*** 0.032 0.029 -0.194*** 0.077*** 0.061** 
(0.025) (0.031) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.024) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a: N = 3,059 





Table 4.6: Validating time preference proxies among highly and less educated 
Time preference measures  
Less educateda Highly educatedb 
Obesity 
Reranking 
from DF1 to 
other proxies 
Reranking 




from DF1 to 
other proxies 
Reranking 
from DF2 to 
other proxies 
CI ΔCI ΔCI CI ΔCI ΔCI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Hyperbolic discount factor 
(DF1) 
-0.024 --- --- -0.141*** --- --- (0.023) (0.036) 
Exponential discount factor 
(DF2) 
-0.031 --- --- -0.160*** --- --- (0.021) (0.034) 
Patience -0.029 0.005 -0.002 -0.028 -0.114*** -0.132*** (0.022) (0.031) (0.030) (0.027) (0.043) (0.044) 
Bank account  -0.050*** 0.026 0.020 -0.176*** 0.035 0.016 (0.019) (0.030) (0.024) (0.031) (0.046) (0.038) 
Max credit card  -0.071*** 0.047 0.041 -0.158*** 0.017 -0.002 (0.023) (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.039) (0.032) 
Bankruptcy -0.056*** 0.032 0.026 -0.089*** -0.053 -0.071** (0.021) (0.034) (0.028) (0.018) (0.038) (0.030) 
Smoking 0.003 -0.028 -0.034 -0.065*** -0.077* -0.096** (0.018) (0.032) (0.027) (0.025) (0.045) (0.037) 
Life insurance -0.010 -0.015 -0.021 -0.127*** -0.015 -0.034 (0.023) (0.034) (0.028) (0.045) (0.063) (0.053) 
Vocational clubs 0.013 -0.038 -0.044 -0.045** -0.096*** -0.115*** (0.022) (0.029) (0.027) (0.017) (0.036) (0.031) 
Armed Forces Qualification 
Test (AFQT) 
-0.046*** 0.022 0.016 -0.116*** -0.025 -0.044 
(0.014) (0.027) (0.021) (0.017) (0.036) (0.029) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a: N = 3,059 





Table 4.7: Validating time preference proxies among white and nonwhite 




from DF1 to 
other proxies 
Reranking 




from DF1 to 
other proxies 
Reranking 
from DF2 to 
other proxies 
CI ΔCI ΔCI CI ΔCI ΔCI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Hyperbolic discount factor 
(DF1) 
-0.057*** --- --- -0.054** --- --- (0.013) (0.022) 
Exponential discount factor 
(DF2) 
-0.088*** --- --- -0.084*** --- --- (0.016) (0.021) 
Patience 0.025 -0.082*** -0.113*** -0.091*** 0.036 0.006 (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) 
Bank account  -0.049*** -0.008 -0.039** -0.142*** 0.088*** 0.058** (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) 
Max credit card  -0.057*** 0.000 -0.031* -0.112*** 0.058** 0.028 (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.029) (0.026) 
Bankruptcy -0.090*** 0.033 0.002 -0.159*** 0.105*** 0.075*** (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.026) (0.032) (0.026) 
Smoking -0.029 -0.028 -0.059*** -0.151*** 0.097*** 0.067*** (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.026) (0.029) (0.025) 
Life insurance -0.046** -0.011 -0.042* -0.104*** 0.050 0.020 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.033) (0.028) 
Vocational clubs -0.058*** 0.001 -0.030 -0.112*** 0.057** 0.027 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) 
Armed Forces Qualification 
Test (AFQT) 
-0.043*** -0.014 -0.045*** -0.132*** 0.077*** 0.047** 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.029) (0.024) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a: N = 2,966 





Table 4.8: A summary of the validated time preference proxies 
 




educated Nonwhite White 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Patience Hyperbolic Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Exponential  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Bank account Hyperbolic No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Exponential  No Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Max credit card Hyperbolic No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Exponential  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Bankruptcy Hyperbolic No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Exponential  Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Smoking Hyperbolic Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Exponential  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Life insurance Hyperbolic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Exponential  Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Vocational clubs Hyperbolic Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Exponential  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT) 
Hyperbolic No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 




Table 4.9: Validating time preference proxies setting the obesity threshold equal to 25 
(kg/m2) 
Time preference measures 
Obesity 
Reranking 
from DF1 to 
other proxies 
Reranking 
from DF2 to 
other proxies 
CI ΔCI ΔCI 
(1) (2) (3) 
Hyperbolic discount factor (DF1) -0.074*** --- --- (0.010) 
Exponential discount factor 
(DF2) 
-0.075*** --- --- (0.009) 
Patience -0.090*** 0.016 0.014 (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Bank account -0.110*** 0.036*** 0.034*** (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Max credit card -0.099*** 0.025** 0.024** (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) 
Bankruptcy -0.096*** 0.022* 0.021* (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) 
Smoking -0.063*** -0.011 -0.013 (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
Life insurance -0.052*** -0.022* -0.024** (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
Vocational clubs -0.081*** 0.007 0.005 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT) 
-0.109*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table 4.10: Validating time preference proxies setting the obesity threshold equal to 35 
(kg/m2) 
Time preference measures 
Obesity 
Reranking 
from DF1 to 
other proxies 
Reranking 
from DF2 to 
other proxies 
CI ΔCI ΔCI 
(1) (2) (3) 
Hyperbolic discount factor (DF1) -0.147*** --- --- (0.029) 
Exponential discount factor 
(DF2) 
-0.185*** --- --- (0.027) 
Patience -0.141*** -0.006 -0.044 (0.034) (0.039) (0.037) 
Bank account -0.237*** 0.090** 0.052* (0.032) (0.040) (0.031) 
Max credit card -0.182*** 0.035 -0.003 (0.031) (0.037) (0.031) 
Bankruptcy -0.192*** 0.045 0.007 (0.034) (0.043) (0.034) 
Smoking -0.153*** 0.005 -0.032 (0.035) (0.045) (0.038) 
Life insurance -0.162*** 0.015 -0.022 (0.035) (0.046) (0.038) 
Vocational clubs -0.113*** -0.034 -0.071** (0.033) (0.037) (0.033) 
Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT) 
-0.219*** 0.072* 0.034 
(0.032) (0.038) (0.030) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table 4.11: Validating time preference proxies setting the obesity threshold equal to 40 
(kg/m2) 
Time preference measures 
Obesity 
Reranking 
from DF1 to 
other proxies 
Reranking 
from DF2 to 
other proxies 
CI ΔCI ΔCI 
(1) (2) (3) 
Hyperbolic discount factor (DF1) -0.155*** --- --- (0.045) 
Exponential discount factor 
(DF2) 
-0.216*** --- --- (0.042) 
Patience -0.172*** 0.016 -0.044 (0.057) (0.064) (0.059) 
Bank account -0.296*** 0.140** 0.080 (0.054) (0.068) (0.052) 
Max credit card -0.179*** 0.024 -0.036 (0.052) (0.062) (0.050) 
Bankruptcy -0.210*** 0.054 -0.006 (0.057) (0.073) (0.055) 
Smoking -0.208*** 0.053 -0.008 (0.061) (0.077) (0.063) 
Life insurance -0.230*** 0.074 0.014 (0.061) (0.078) (0.065) 
Vocational clubs -0.068 -0.088 -0.148*** (0.054) (0.062) (0.054) 
Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT) 
-0.254*** 0.099 0.039 
(0.055) (0.064) (0.049) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table 4.12: The magnitude of the CIs and the number of valid proxies for different 
obesity thresholds 
Obesity threshold 
Concentration Index The number of valid proxies 
Maximum Minimum Hyperbolic Exponential 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
25 (kg/m2) obesity threshold -0.052 -0.109 3 3 
30 (kg/m2) obesity threshold -0.105 -0.178 4 6 
35 (kg/m2) obesity threshold -0.113 -0.219 6 6 





Table 4.13: Hyperbolic time preferences vs. exponential time preferences 
  
Obesity threshold  
Reranking from the hyperbolic to 
the exponential discount factor 
ΔCI 
25 (kg/m2) obesity threshold 0.002 (0.004) 
30 (kg/m2) obesity threshold 0.019** (0.008) 
35 (kg/m2) obesity threshold 0.038*** (0.014) 
40 (kg/m2) obesity threshold 0.060** (0.025) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




Table 4.14: Hyperbolic time preferences vs. exponential time preferences for different 
groups 
  
Obesity threshold  
Reranking from the hyperbolic to 
the exponential discount factor 
ΔCI 
Malea  0.003 (0.012) 
Femaleb 0.016** (0.008) 
Less educatedc 0.006 (0.011) 
Highly educatedd 0.019 (0.017) 
Nonwhitee 0.031*** (0.006) 
Whitef 0.030*** (0.010) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a:  N = 3,059 
b:  N = 3,035 
c:  N = 3,059 
d:  N = 3,194 
e:  N = 2,966 




Chapter 5: Conclusion  
This dissertation discusses three essays in food consumption and health-related 
issues. The first essay discusses Food-Away-From-Home (FAFH) consumption. We 
hypothesize that consumers compensate for the high caloric intake typically associated 
with FAFH by changing their behaviors during other meals. We use data from the 2009-
10 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES). The NHANES 
provides information on food intake for two nonconsecutive days. On day one, 
consumers were personally interviewed, and on day two consumers were interviewed by 
phone. The NHANES asked consumers about their beliefs regarding FAFH, which 
allows us to elaborate on the cognitive aspects of the compensating behavior. There is a 
consensus among consumers that FAFH is less nutritious than food cooked at home. 
Despite this, consumers still demand FAFH for other reasons like price, convenience, or 
socializing. We use the theory of cognitive dissonance to explain how this inconsistency 
of consumers’ beliefs and actions creates a state of cognitive dissonance. To resolve 
dissonance, consumers compensate for FAFH by changing their behaviors during other 
meals in the day. 
We limit the analysis to individuals for whom we obtained information about 
beliefs and exploit the panel nature of the NHANES, employing a fixed effect estimator 
to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
results in a downward bias for the compensatory behavior. The results show that 
consumers ingest more calories away from home than they do at home but compensate 




We also run two tests for the robustness of the consistency of our results with the 
theory of cognitive dissonance. First, FAFH is high in addictive food components, sugar, 
salt, fat, and carbohydrates. If addiction prevents the compensating behavior, the results 
are inconsistent with the theory of cognitive dissonance. The analysis states the 
compensating behavior for the high amount of sugar, salt, fat, and carbohydrates from 
FAFH. Second, we perform a placebo test to estimate the effect of plain water on energy 
consumption. It is implausible to expect drinking water to create a conflict between 
beliefs and action like FAFH. The results for plain water are statistically insignificant. 
Overall, these two tests provide evidence of the consistency of our results with the theory 
of cognitive dissonance. 
Essay II discusses the mindless and the mindfulness of secondary eating. 
Secondary eating is that which occurs while doing other activities like driving or 
watching TV. When someone engages in secondary eating, he or she might overeat and 
gain weight. Essay II tests the effect of secondary eating on obesity. We identify 
situations when secondary eating is positively related to obesity (mindless secondary 
eating) and cases where secondary eating is negatively related to obesity (mindful 
secondary eating). We hypothesize that lifestyle moderates the effect of secondary eating 
on obesity. 
 We use data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). A subsample of the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) was randomly selected to provide diaries for 24 hours. 
The Eating and Health Module contains information on secondary eating. The results 
show that spending more time doing sedentary activities that require lying and sitting 




sedentary activities that mostly involves lying or sitting increases the chances for 
mindless secondary eating as opposed to eating while doing less sedentary activities that 
require some movements. 
Essay III validates the use of time preference proxies to estimate the effect of time 
preferences on health outcomes. To determine the effect of time preferences on health 
outcomes, researchers either elicit the rate of time preference or use proxies. This paper 
determines if variations in elicited discount rates correspond to variations in time 
preference proxies in the estimation of health outcomes. For health outcome, we focus 
our analysis on obesity. We utilize data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY79), which provides information that can be used as proxies as well as two 
elicitation questions. The first elicitation question is over a month horizon, and the 
second is over a year horizon. We exploit the differences over time for the elicitation 
questions to validate proxies under the fixed exponential discounting and hyperbolic 
discounting. The results confirm the use of time preference proxies in the estimation of 
health outcomes. Under hyperbolic discounting, we validate the proxies of patience, 
smoking, life insurance, and joining vocational clubs in high school. Under exponential 
discounting, we also validate the proxies of patience, maxing out a credit card, 
bankruptcy, smoking, life insurance, and joining vocational clubs. Other proxies 
overestimate patience by 5% under hyperbolic discounting and by 4% under exponential 
discounting. 
To reduce obesity, consumers must balance between energy consumption and 
expenditure. Eating FAFH does not entail a poor diet and obesity, and eating at home 




importance whether eating is the primary or secondary task when consumers maintain a 
balanced diet. A balanced diet reflects the willpower to forgo present gratifications for 
future benefits. Understanding why consumers lack such willpower is essential to help 
people balance between energy consumption and expenditure. For example, if the present 
bias is relatively high, consumers might engage in some commitment devices, such as 
keeping healthy options at home to assure the compensating behavior for FAFH or 
preparing a limited amount of food to reduce any possibility of overeating when eating 
occurs while doing other activities. Finally, future research should consider the 
interdependence of FAFH, secondary eating, and time preferences in the examination of 
obesity causes. Since people eat several meals throughout the day, the rate of time 
preference might change from one meal to another, so they might overeat when the 
present bias is high and compensate when the present bias is low. The availability of 
FAFH may contribute to the increased time of mindless secondary eating. Perhaps, time 
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